Trump and KGB Part 3: If We "Follow the Money", Where Does it Lead?

There's lots of financial "smoke" -- but is it an espionage fire?

This is Part 3 of “Trump and KGB” and it’s offered in collaboration with The Morning Truth where Jane Prescott has done an in-depth analysis of Trump’s Deutsche Bank connections. Please refer to Jane’s excellent research for additional depth and detailed research, all of which has been considered in what follows here. Thanks, Jane!

What We Know (and Don’t Know) So Far

Part 1

In Part 1 (link here) we reviewed evidence including declassified files of the Czech intelligence service (StB) that establish beyond reasonable doubt that as a result of his marriage in 1977 to Czech citizen Ivana Marie Zelníčková, Trump came under active scrutiny by the Czech StB. This is thoroughly documented via declassified StB files, and should be considered a “fact that is not in dispute.” StB files confirm that the Czech service was watching him, with Ivana’s father making regular reports and other measures taken to assess him. Based on the normal practices at the time, it is reasonable to assume that this created KGB awareness as well, but this is just a “reasonable assumption”, not an established fact. We further established that by 1980 the KGB had definitely become aware of Trump, if not through the StB, then through Semyon “Sam” Kislin, a New York electronics store owner and Soviet Jewish emigre who has admitted as recently as 2017 that he was a source of info on Trump to the KGB in 1980.

Part 2

In Part 2 (link here) we looked at the 1987 official Trump visit to Moscow. This trip without question gave KGB officers the opportunity for direct contact with Trump at a time when KGB First Chief Directorate Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov had put out a directive to develop and recruit US and western businessmen. It is an analytical certainty that KGB officers were embedded in the Soviet government entourage and thus we can conclude with a high level of probability that the KGB used this visit to at least attempt to establish the basis for ongoing contact with a goal of using the contact with Trump to their advantage. We also know with certainty that a few months after returning from the USSR Trump took out $100k in ads in which he promoted talking points that the US should curtail its support of allies who were, in essence, getting a ‘free ride’ from the US. This point of view can reasonably be understood as in line with arguments the Kremlin and KGB fully supported and would have an interest in seeing promoted. But we do not have any clear evidence connecting the ads to KGB or Kremlin influence.

It is against this background that we then considered the accusations of former Kazakh KGB Chief Alnur Mussayev that Trump was recruited about this time and given the code name “Krasnov”— as well as accusations from former KGB officer Yuri Shvets that Trump at this point was an “asset”, cooperating with his KGB handlers (but not necessarily fully ‘recruited’). These accusations heighten the intensity of the questions surrounding Trump’s history with the KGB, but neither can be considered definitive as neither participated directly in any recruitment. With the foregoing as background, we now turn to ‘Follow the Money’ as a means of seeking to learn more. At the outset, I will underscore that our “deeper look” investigation has, up to this point, produced clear evidence that Trump was being scrutinized and developed by KGB, and took at least one action (the ads) that seems oddly in synch with Kremlin/KGB interests—but beyond that, has not produced evidence that would allow us to reach any conclusion about Trump’s relationship with KGB as of the late 1980’s.

Is “Follow The Money” a Valid Approach?

One of the reasons I have turned to ‘follow the money’ for Part 3 is that, once we get past 1987, most of the accusations of Trump/KGB connection revolve around financial transactions involving Russian money - transactions that can be viewed as indicators of KGB manipulation or support. Those who accuse Trump of being a KGB agent or asset invariably invoke the evidence of decades of financial benefit that Trump has received from dubious Russian sources including oligarchs, mafia-connected individuals, and Deutsche Bank — a bank whose solvency is to a large degree linked to Russian deposits. He has also frequently been involved with business associates with traceable links to KGB/FSB. So yes, it is beyond clear that over the years Trump has had a tremendous amount of financial connectivity to Russia and Russian financial interests, and has had contact with individuals who had links to KGB/FSB — and this in turn has been cited repeatedly as evidence of ……something.

But what, exactly?

The problem is this. Even if we stipulate that Trump was the beneficiary of many millions of dollars (even hundreds of millions of dollars) of Russian money that was tainted by likely connection to the KGB/FSB, what does this prove?

Broadly speaking, if we acknowledge that the money flowed to Trump favorably from such sources, it leads to a situation where one of several scenarios would have to apply:

• A: “It’s Just Business” — Trump, a high-profile, flamboyant businessman, went to Moscow in 1987 at the invitation of the Soviet Government to try and set up a Trump Tower Moscow project and potentially other projects. He followed up on this for years, trying at least five times to get a project going. In the course of these efforts he met many Russian oligarchs, including unsavory ‘Russian Mafia’ connected individuals, who saw in Trump an opportunity to advance their interests and as a result of all this, money in various forms flowed to Trump from his Moscow efforts. Some of it may have been illegal money-laundering which Trump may have been aware of and turned a blind eye to. But under the scenario — all of it was organic to his business efforts and was not being directed by the KGB, or at a minimum Trump understood it to be organic to his business efforts.

• B: “It’s the KGB, Stupid” But Trump Didn’t Know That: - Under this scenario, because of the way Russia and in particular post-Soviet Russia works, the hand of the KGB and its successor organization FSB would undoubtedly be at play in the money flow to Trump, but Trump would not necessarily have been directly told this was the case. To him, it would just seem like “it’s just business” even though the KGB/FSB dimension was driving it.

• C: ‘It’s the KGB, Stupid, and Trump Knew It”. This is the “Trump was recruited” scenario, including the possibility of everything from an informal “we’re your friends and we’ll help you and hope you’ll help us” arrangement that stopped short of formal recruitment, to a full and formal recruitment in which Trump would have known he was in a committed relationship with KGB in which there were clear expectations and responsibilities to be met.

So … which is it? And what threshold level of evidence is required for a reasonable counterintelligence investigation to conclude it was B or C?

Let’s do a deeper dive and see where it leads.

The First of Many Financial Benefits, and the 1,300 that Followed

Even before the 1987 trip to Moscow there was a transaction that bears mentioning. In 1984, Russian David Bogatin, who was close to the notorious Russian mafia gangster in the US, Semyon ‘Sam’ Mogilevich, met with Trump to buy five apartments in his Trump Tower for $6 million. The apartments were later confiscated by the US government, which claimed they were used to launder money for the Russian mafia. This information was first reported by Craig Unger in his book House of Trump, House of Putin. Unger reports that he has documented about 1,300 such deals between Trump and Russian mafiosi, that is, these are not isolated cases, but an entire corruption scheme. (MS Comment: I have not seen the underlying documentation on the 1,300 cases, but Mr. Unger is a credible reporter who would not be likely to make such a claim without ‘having the receipts.’ I hope to be able to study this more. Meanwhile - it’s important to keep in mind that we are looking for anything that might cement the idea of an ‘agent relationship’ between. Trump and the KGB/FSB. This information, while compelling, falls into the category of questionable, potentially ‘corrupt’ business practices that may have a KGB component but does not directly prove a KGB connection or KGB control over the situation or Trump. So — is it possible the KGB had a hand in all this? Definitely so. But it’s also possible this happened organically due to business associations, etc. I genuinely hope to have a chance to discuss this with Mr. Unger as he has clearly done the research and investigation. Provisionally, though, I would conclude that these transactions suggest a strong likelihood of KGB/FSB involvement — but a) do not prove KGB/FSB involvement, and b) do not prove that Trump understood these favorable transactions to have been generated by the KGB on Trump’s behalf with an expectation of particular behavior from Trump in return. “Not proven” does not mean “does not exist.”

Trump’s Financial Struggles and Russian Money

Trump’s circumstances evolved rapidly after the fall of the Soviet Union, and this needs to be considered. By the early 1990s, Trump was in financial distress, making even more vulnerable to manipulation than he was in 1987. His casino empire was bleeding money, and U.S. banks—burned by his repeated bankruptcies—were no longer willing to lend to him. Enter a pattern that would define much of Trump's financial life: a series of cash infusions, partnerships, and mysterious financing deals with ties to post-Soviet Russian oligarchs.

Some key examples:

• 1990s – Bayrock Group & Tevfik Arif: A key figure in Trump’s Russian financial orbit was Tevfik Arif, a Soviet-born businessman with deep ties to the post-Soviet oligarchy. Arif founded the Bayrock Group, a development company that worked closely with Trump on real estate deals, including Trump SoHo in New York. Bayrock’s financing streams were opaque, but they funneled millions into Trump properties at a time when traditional U.S. lenders had abandoned him.

• Felix Sater & the Russian Laundromat: Another Bayrock-linked figure, Felix Sater, was a Russian-American businessman with criminal ties and links to Russian intelligence. Sater helped broker real estate deals on Trump’s behalf, and his firm was involved in projects that received money from sources later tied to Russian organized crime and money laundering networks.

• 2000s – The Trump Real Estate Cash Surge: Starting in the early 2000s, Trump's properties began to attract a disproportionate number of Russian buyers. Financial disclosures and investigative reports indicate that a significant number of Trump-branded condos—particularly in Florida—were purchased by Russian nationals, often using shell companies that obscured the true sources of funds. In 2008, Donald Trump Jr. himself admitted: "Russians make up a pretty disproportionate cross-section of a lot of our assets... We see a lot of money pouring in from Russia.”

• Deutsche Bank & the $300M Mystery: One of the only major Western financial institutions still willing to lend to Trump was Deutsche Bank, which became his primary lender for over $300 million in loans. Notably, Deutsche Bank has been investigated for laundering billions of dollars of Russian money, raising questions about whether Russian-linked funds played a role in keeping Trump’s empire afloat. (MS Comment: For more on this, please read The Morning Truth article on this that just came out as a “collab” with this post. )

A Pattern of Russian Leverage?

Taken together, these transactions paint a clear picture:

1. Trump’s businesses were financially reliant on Russian-linked capital at key moments in his career.

2. These financial entanglements overlap with known Russian intelligence and organized crime networks.

3. Many of Trump’s key business associates—Sater, Arif, and others—had direct ties to Russian state actors.

So, the question is: Was this just business, or was it part of a larger intelligence strategy?

Again — we return to the three Scenarios — Scenario A (organic business), Scenario B — (KGB/FSB orchestrated without Trump understanding), or Scenario C — (KGB/FSB orchestrated as part of a formalized relationship with Trump.).

To reach even a provisional conclusion about which Scenario is most likely, it’s important to have an awareness of how Russian intelligence thinks, and operates:

Trump and the “Active Measures” Playbook

Russian intelligence operations frequently follow a methodology known as “active measures” (активные мероприятия)—a blend of espionage, disinformation, and influence operations aimed at shaping political and economic outcomes. The financial pattern we see in Trump’s history aligns with classic “cultivation” tactics used by the KGB and its successors:

• Step 1: Identify a Target (Trump is already on the radar via StB files in the late ‘70s).

• Step 2: Build Contact & Develop a Relationship (1987 Moscow trip, interactions with KGB-linked operatives).

• Step 3: Leverage Financial Dependence (Trump’s 1990s financial struggles, influx of Russian-linked cash).

• Step 4: Exploit & Maintain Influence (Ongoing connections through Russian-linked deals, including Deutsche Bank financing).

As the foregoing suggests, the KGB/FSB would see benefit by following these four steps in a way that wouldn’t necessarily involve “recruiting” Trump formally. Remember that the goal is to gain benefit from the relationship, without risking more than necessary. In the case of Trump, a key question the KGB would have asked is — what is the risk/gain analysis for a) a looser, less structured involvement, versus b) a full recruitment attempt and, if successful, a more controlled ‘agent’ relationship.

This is where we need to try and climb inside the mindset of the KGB as they, at various stages, looked at the potential “risk vs gain.”

Would the KGB Think a Formal Recruitment Was Necessary?

Trump was not a source of secret intelligence—meaning the “ask” from KGB would be more subtle or nuanced than in —a classic case of “buying state secrets.” Trump had no state secrets to offer and his value was arguably more in the realm of propaganda at first— a prominent businessman willing to adopt Kremlin talking points—and later, potentially, as a political player who might pursue policies that aligned with Russia. In the mix with this was Trump’s personality — grandiose, narcissistic, impulsive, unrestrained. Part of the assessment would be that Trump is a person who on the hand desperately needs affirmations of his ‘greatness’ — yet who in spite of that neediness also desperately needs to feel in control. These personality traits could pose problems for a formal recruitment attempt that would place him in the role of a managed, controlled agent. But these same traits would work well in a looser, less controlled “collaborator” or “special contact” role. In such a relationship KGB would have less control, but also less risk with plenty of upside. This doesn’t mean that a recruitment never happened. But I do think that it is more likely that a more nuanced relationship was established —one that left Trump feeling he was in control, but which gave the KGB the benefit of an “asset” able to help in various ways.

What About Kompromat?

There is the famous ‘pee tape’ from 2013, which was included in the Steele Dossier and may or may not actually exist. And there are potentially other pieces of ‘kompromat’ in the financial area that might be part of the equation. These could very likely exist and play a role in manipulating Trump, but I am not inclined to put too much weight on them. Trump has shown himself able to be able to withstand numerous disclosures or exposures that would sink any other politician, but each time there is a storm, he is able to weather it. Knowing that there is negative information about him in the hands of the KGB/FSB/Putin would likely play a role in Trump’s behavior, and might serve as an “additional inducement” to support Kremlin policies, but I think it would be unwise to assign it greater force than that.

Final Thoughts: What Does This Mean?

The provisional conclusion here is that by the time Trump first ran for President in 2015, it is likely he was a Russian ‘asset’ in a relationship that fell short of full controlled ‘recruitment’ and was rather one in which Trump himself believed he was acting independently, but in which in reality he was being manipulated into adopting positions and taking actions that benefitted Putin’s regime. This is a provisional conclusion only, and the idea that he at some point was pitched and fully recruited as an ‘agent’ remains in the realm of a ‘possibility not to be excluded.” But the greater weight of evidence suggests something less formal and more fluid.

(MS Comment: I know that this cautious provisional conclusion will be frustrating for some readers who are convinced Trump is a recruited, controlled Russian Agent. That possibility surely exists, and if new evidence beomes available it would definitely have the potential to change my provisional conclusion. It’s always like that in any investigation. You collect facts and at some point you begin to develop a ‘theory of the case’ based on the evidence but as an investigator or counterintelligence professional you remain open to the other possibilities, and if new evidence leads to those other possibilities you have to be prepared to change your theory. At this point, with the facts available to us, I think the most viable theory is the one I’ve put forward—but will remain open to changing that view if further evidence comes to light.)

Next; Russia and The 2016 Campaign — Seen Against the Background of Trump’s Relationship with KGB/FSB.