Trump and KGB Part 2: Was Trump Actually Recruited on his 1987 Moscow Trip?

I'm an Ex-CiA Russia specialist and here's my detailed assessment.

This is Part 2 of Trump and KGB. I’m generally working through it chronologically. In Part 1 i looked at the 1970’s, and in particular the Czeck StB’s longrunning surveillance of Trump after his marriage to ivana Zelníčková in 1977. Now we are into the 1980s and the attention shifts to the recent claims that Trump was recruited by KGB during his 1987 Moscow trip. Followig is a close look at those claims and my ’’probability assessment” of whether an actual recruitment occurred or not. In mang such assessment I’ve made an effort to separate what we a) know for sure, b) believe to be true with near certainty, and c) what remains highly speculative.

Introduction — About ‘Recruitent’ and What the Entire Process Entails, as the KGB Practiced it

A word of explanation — recruitment is part of a process and it’s important to understand the process because any attempt at assessment of whether Trump was recruited or not only makes sense if you understand the process and some nuances of what ‘recruitment’ might mean.

The KGB's recruitment process was methodical and was designed to identify, assess, and recruit individuals who could provide valuable intelligence, be influential, or provide useful support. The process typically involved several stages:​

1. Spotting: Identifying individuals with access to desired information or influence. This could involve professionals such as diplomats, scientists, or businesspeople.​

2. Assessing: Evaluating the potential recruit's motivations, vulnerabilities, and suitability. Common motives exploited included:

   • Financial Need/Greed: Offering financial incentives.​

   • Ideology: Appealing to shared political beliefs.​

   • Ego: Flattering the individual's sense of importance, grandiosity, and need for attention, admiration, and approval.

   • Emotional Triggers: Exploiting personal relationships or grievances — for example, a person who is in conflict with superiors in his organization and who feels he is undervalued.​

   • Compromise (Kompromat): Using blackmail based on personal indiscretions.​ (Comment — neither the KGB nor CIA used ‘kompromat’ as a primary tool for the simple reasons that a coerced, resentful agent is not likely to perform well. A better way to understand this is that, for example, the KGB would certainly be more than happy to create a scenario where kompromat existed, but it might never be mentioned — just an unspoken item in the background. If used at all, it’s use would likely be more subtle than blatant blackmail.)

3. Access: If a target appears promising a mechanism providing access to the target for further assessment and development must be established.

4. Development: Building a relationship to gauge willingness and reliability. This phase might involve subtle requests for non-sensitive information to test compliance and establish trust.​

5. Recruitment: Formally engaging the individual as an asset. This could be a direct proposition or a gradual realization by the recruit of their involvement. It could range from being a ‘witting collaborator’ who worked in concert with KGB without receiving a direct salary, to being a fully controlled ‘agent’ who is paid and fully engages in the use of secrecy, etc.

6. Handling: Managing the asset to extract information or exert influence while ensuring their security and continued cooperation.​

Against the foreging backdrop of the process — the KGB categorized their assets based on their level and type of involvement and awareness. :​

• Confidential Contact: Someone in a position of influence who may not see themselves as an agent but provides information or assistance.​

• Agent: An individual knowingly providing intelligence, often under a formal agreement and with specific tasks.​ The most well unerstood type of ‘agent’ would be one who provides secret information. Another high level type of agent that is fairly well understood would be an ‘agent of influence’ — someone who could influence the policies of the target country. And then there would be lower level types of agents — for example, access agents who provide introductions or ‘access’ to targets of interest.

One other distinction — you hear the term ‘agent’ and ‘asset’ used a lot. This is more of an English language distinction than a Russian language one, but it’s important when assessing what may or may not have happened with Trump. An agent, as outlined above, would generally ge a recruited, controlled ‘asset’ — whereas other ‘assets’ might not necessarily be a fully controlled agent. A ‘confidetial contact’, for example, would be an ‘asset’ ut not an ‘agent.’ This may sound lie splitting hairs but it’s important to an understanding of the Trump/KGB story to have these distinctions in mind.

We Know for Certain That The KGB Had Access to Trump, and Can Reliably Assess That the KGB Assessed Him as a Potential Recruitment Target

The 1987 Moscow trip unquestionally gave the KGB access to Trump. Such a trip could not have been offered or organized on the Russian side without security approvals and involvement by the Committee For State Security — the KGB. As to the trip itself, we know that in July 1987, Trump, accompanied by his wife Ivana and her assistant Lisa Calandra, embarked on his inaugural visit to the Soviet Union. This trip was initiated by an invitation from Yuri Dubinin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, who had previously engaged with Trump during a luncheon in New York City. ​

During their stay, the Trumps were accommodated in the Lenin Suite at the National Hotel in Moscow, a location historically significant as it had once housed Vladimir Lenin. The suite was situated near Red Square and was known to be under KGB surveillance, implying that Trump's activities were likely monitored during his visit.

Throughout the trip, Soviet officials escorted Trump to various sites in Moscow and Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), discussing potential real estate ventures, including the construction of a luxury hotel in Moscow. Although these discussions did not culminate in immediate business deals, the visit marked the beginning of Trump's longstanding interest in establishing a presence in the Russian market.

In addition to knowng the foregoing about the 1987 trip, we also know from declassified Czeck intelligence files that following Trump's marriage to Ivana Zelníčková in 1977, the Czechoslovak secret service (StB) initiated a surveillance operation codenamed "Ivana." The StB monitored Trump's activities, including his business ventures and political aspirations, and undoubtedly shared intelligence with the KGB. ​ This went on for a number of years.

The Varous Claims About the 1987 Trip and Possible Recruitment

We know that three former KGB officers, Yuri Shvets, Alnur Mussayev, , claim that he was developed and recruited by KGB in the 1980s. ​Both Alnur Mussayev and Yuri Shvets, former Soviet intelligence officers, have discussed Donald Trump's interactions with the KGB during the 1980s, particularly focusing on his 1987 visit to Moscow. Their perspectives, while overlapping in certain areas, offer distinct insights:​

Alnur Mussayev's Claims:

• Recruitment Assertion: Mussayev, who served in the 6th Directorate of the USSR's KGB—responsible for recruiting businessmen from capitalist countries—claims that during Trump's 1987 visit to Moscow, the KGB recruited him as an intelligence asset under the codename "Krasnov."

  (MS Comment: Although it is confirmed that Mussayev served in the 6th Directorate, it also appears that during the critical period aroud 1987 he was seconded to a unit in the Ministry of the Interior that had similar responsibilities to the KGB Sixth Directorate — but would mean there is some question about his direct access to the recruitment he claims happened.) ​

Yuri Shvets' Perspective:

• Cultivation Over Recruitment: Shvets, a former KGB major in the First Chief Directorate (the KGB unit that sent officers overseas to work undercover) who served in Washington from 1985-87, indicates that the KGB had been cultivating Trump as an asset for several years, starting from his marriage to Ivana Zelníčková in 1977. He suggests that Trump's 1987 Moscow visit was part of this long-term cultivation strategy. ​He uses the term ‘special unofficial contact’ to describe the relationship in the aftermath of the 1987 trip.

Post-Visit Activities: Shvets points out that following the 1987 trip, Trump took out full-page newspaper ads criticizing U.S. foreign policy and defense spending—stances that aligned with Soviet interests at the time.

Sergei Zhirnov's Perspective

Zhirnov, an ex-KGB officer residing in France, has supported claims that Trump was being actively cultivated by the KGB at the time of the trip to Moscow in 1987.

While all three former KGB officers highlight the significance of Trump's 1987 Moscow visit in the context of KGB operations, their narratives differ slightly:​ In particular;

• Mussayev explicitly asserts that Trump was recruited as a KGB agent during the 1987 trip, assigning him the codename "Krasnov."​

• Shvets emphasizes a prolonged cultivation process, with the 1987 visit serving as a pivotal moment in the KGB's efforts to influence Trump, but stops short of confirming formal recruitment.​

​In addition to the assertions made by Alnur Mussayev and Yuri Shvets regarding Donald Trump's alleged recruitment by the KGB during his 1987 Moscow visit, other non-KGB sources and individuals have echoed similar claims:​

Luke Harding's Investigation:

• KGB Orchestration of 1987 Moscow Visit: British journalist Luke Harding, in his 2017 Politico article, posited that Trump's 1987 trip to Moscow was likely orchestrated by the KGB as part of their efforts to cultivate Western individuals susceptible to flattery and ambition. Harding suggests that the KGB's Political Intelligence Department, under directives from First Chief Directorate head Vladimir Kryuchkov, targeted Trump due to his political aspirations and ego. ​ (Comment: I agree with most of the foregoing. We know for sure that Kryuchkov had issued a directive to recruit foreign businessmen, for example, and it is a reasonable assumption that KGB Political intelligence was largely running the show for the visit. But this does not equate to ‘recruitment.’

Oleg Kalugin's Allegations:

• Potential KGB Asset Since 1987: Former KGB General Oleg Kalugin alleged that Trump could have been a KGB asset since his 1987 visit to Moscow. Kalugin claimed that the operation to lure Trump began with an overture in March 1986 by Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations Yuri Dubinin, leading to Trump's Moscow trip the following year. ​

These accounts, while varying in specifics, collectively suggest that Trump's 1987 Moscow visit was a focal point for KGB efforts to cultivate or recruit him as an asset.

Did KGB Influence Play a Role in Trump’s Post 1987 Trip Actions? Almost Certainly - Yes

An indicator of what might have happened in Moscow is — what were Trump’s actions afterward? In 1987, shortly after his return from Moscow, Donald Trump made a notable foray into the realm of U.S. foreign policy by purchasing full-page advertisements in major newspapers, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Boston Globe. These ads, collectively costing approximately $94,801, bore the headline: "There's nothing wrong with America's Foreign Defense Policy that a little backbone can't cure." ​ The letters took issue with the US providing financial support to allies who were capable of shouldering more of their own defense burden. This marked Trump’s entry into the national political scene via policy positions that mirrored Soviet propaganda points and, if implemented, would drive a wedge between the US and its allies — something that also aligned with Soviet goals. Many who are now examining Trump’s history of involvement with Russian intelligence point to this as evidence of KGB influence. Shvets, for example, notes that this action was reportedly celebrated by the KGB as a successful "active measure," reflecting the agency's influence on Trump's viewpoints.

Bottom Line Assessment

Here is my bottom line assessment.

it’s 100% certain that the KGB assessed Trump, gained access to him via the trip to Moscow and used the trip to develop and cultivate him as a potential asset and perhaps, at some point, a recruited agent. This much I would consider to be virtually 100% certain.

As to whether he was recruited or not, I would first of all refer to the spectrum I discussed above. Think of the spectrum from ‘target’ on one end, then all the steps of assssment, development, ‘confidential contact’, and ‘agent.’ I think there is a high probability that Trump had reached, or was on the cusp of becoming, a ‘confidential contact’ by the time he left Moscow.

Shvet used the term ‘special unofficial contact’ and I find that credible. This is not altogether in conflict with Mussayev’s claim of recruitment. Such status would have, for example, resulted in a code name being issue and so ‘Krasnov’ may well have been the name given to Trump as an ‘asset’ (not yet ‘agent’, at least at this point).

What would such a relationship signify?

To Trump, it would likely seem satisfyingly transactional. He would opportunities for accummulating wealth with the help of his new ‘friends’, whom he would feel no hesitation to help since he could rationalize it all as ‘good for business’ and ‘good for relations’ between the two countries. As a private businessman he had no government secrets to reveal and as a result he woul more likely see his relationshp in terms of business development than epionage.

A layer on top of this that Trump might have been somewhat aware of is that the Soviet contacts seemed to clearly recognize and appreciate his business acumen and overall ‘brilliance’ (the flattery factor), and if, for example, they encouraged him to test the political waters it was (he would interpret) because they were astute, not necessarily because they were manipulating him.

So, by the time the 1987 trip was over, I would assess that Trump was definitely substantially far down the ‘development’ path and was likely engaged in some form of ‘special unofficial contact’ that would have left the KGB convinced they had an ‘asset’, while Trump himself would view it as mutual transactional cooperation.

Another observation I would make is that it seems very likely to me that the idea of taking out ads to make a political point would likely have originated with the KGB, at least in part as a way of testing whether Trump would in fact follow through on any influence efforts they suggested. The fact that he did follow through no doubt would have left them encouraged that this was indeed, potentially a productive cooperating contact.

Why Not “Recruited Agent”?

It is still entirely possibe that the KGB had gone all the way to a full recruitment by the time he left Moscow — but I would rate this as a ‘possibility not to be excluded’ rather than the most likely reality. First of all the KGB is not generally in a rush and although they would have been watching him for a long time, as far as I have been able to determine this would have been the first time they had clear ‘hands on’ access to him in a controllable environment. So just in terms of the pacing of it, it would feel a bit rished to push all the way to a full recruitment right then during that first trip to Moscow.

Secondly, I don’t think they would have felt they really needed to push it that far at this point. Trump didn’t have state secrets to sell; his value was more of a longterm proposition and getting it to the point of a sustainable, cooperative continuing contact would have been a ‘win’ without riskng the potential blowback of a premature recruitment pitch gone wrong.

Thirdly, I the only source reporting that truly places him farther along the recruitment spectrum than what I’ve indicated here is Mussayev, and I think there is room for Mussayev’s claims to still be viewed as generally compatible with this view. ‘Recruitment’ could mean full recruitment with control — or it could mean something less formal and more like what I’ve described. Mussayev appears to have been reasonably close to the operation, but not actually in it, and there is the question about him having been seconded to the Ministry of Interior at this time, so it’s possible his access to the information was not direct and immediate.

Anyway — I know some will find it disappointing that I’m not able to jump o the ‘recruited agent’ bandwagon but the evidence in my view does not support this as the most likely situation as of the end the Moscow trip in 1987.

I’ve provided all the basis for reaching that provisional conclusion, and I welcome new information, clarifications, or other opinions based on the same information, or on new information. Please feel free to comment or DM with any such opinions or information.

Meanwhile, the Trump - KGB story continues.

Next up — the 90s.