Part 2: New Starlink Election Fraud Claims: A Deeper Look and a Fact Check
Unpacking Further Evidence and Clarifications From Readers and Proponents of the Claims
Two days ago I posted New Starlink Election Fraud Claims: A Deeper Look and a Fact Check, in which I tried to sift through the evidence that’s circulating on Substack and elsewhere (but not in mainstream media) about a Starlink-connected scheme that may have fraudulently awarded the 2024 election to Donald Trump. I'm not a proponent of the claims; nor am I a "professional skeptic" who takes pleasure in disproving theories. My goal was to sift through the evidence and gain as much insight as I could, and share what I learned.
I asked readers to weigh in with clarifications or additional information, and some did just that—including a detailed response from This Will Hold, the Substack at the forefront of the claims, and whose work on this I genuinely appreciate and respect.
So in this follow-up post, I want to take up the most serious and credible questions, clarifications, and rebuttals. Thanks to everyone who is participating in this process. It’s important.
The Key Clarifications and Rebuttals
In the original post, I outlined what the new theory adds to earlier post-election claims, pointing out that this isn’t just a rerun of the “bullet ballots” or algorithmic vote-shifting claims that surfaced after the 2024 election and then subsided. There are new claims here: specifically claims that that real system updates happened just before the election, that real connectivity channels existed, and that real satellite access points were created — all of which aligned in the weeks before the 2024 election to create an opening for manipulation.
The post from This Will Hold—and comments here from the author and others—introduce several layers of argument that deserve careful unpacking. Here are the arguments that were put forward, which I’ll examine here:
E-Poll vs Voter Tabulation Machines: That the skeptics’ assertion that “Starlink only connected to e-poll voting registration books, not vote tabulation machines” is wrong because, contrary to what officials’ claim, there is not a true firewall beween the e-poll books and the vote tabulation machines.
The “Air Gap” Question: Skeptics claim that the fact that voter tabulation machines are “air gap” protected means they can’t be accesses from the interent. Proponents make the case that many systems billed as “air-gapped” are not truly isolated.
Pro V&V’s “de minimus” Scam: That Pro V&V, one of two federally accredited labs responsible for testing and certifying voting machines used in U.S. elections, falsely labeled substantive changes as “de minimis” to avoid scrutiny of significant firmware changes.
Starlink G2 Satellite Breach: That Starlink’s Gen2 satellite network enables a private, dynamic mesh capable of bypassing traditional network monitoring.
Voter Anomalies in Clarkstown, Not Ramapo: That unexplained anomalies in Clarkstown—not Ramapo—may reflect actual ballot suppression or miscounting.
Each of these points is serious and worthy of scrutiny. So let’s go deeper.
Note: As a shorthand way of making clear who is saying what — I will refer to “proponents” and “skeptics”. This may not be entirely fair to either side but it’s the best I could come up with.
Is There a True Firewall Between E-Poll and Vote Tabulation Machines?
Skeptics contend that the voter tabulation machines are “not connected to the internet” and thus are not vulnerable to internet hacking. The process that protects them is called “air gap,” which means what it sounds like it means—there is an “air gap,” a complete physical separation between the voting system and any external network, preventing data from flowing in or out unless transferred manually. This air gap protection is one of the central rebuttals to the Starlink-connected theory The reply I received challenges this:
“Yes, Starlink was ‘officially’ contracted to service e-poll books in multiple counties. What’s been largely overlooked is that many poll books share ports and internal pathways with tabulation systems—especially when all components run through a central UPS or networked control unit.”
So what the proponents are saying is don’t be fooled by the claim that air gapping creates a true firewall. It doesn’t. Air gapping can be defeated and Musk knows how to do it.
What the Cybersecurity Experts Say
A reader pointed me to a 2023 white paper from Darktrace, titled Securing OT Systems: The Limits of the Air Gap Approach, whcih indeed confirms that air-gaps are not invulnerable, and in many cases are not even absolute.
To follow the arguments here, it’s important to understand the terms IT and OT so—with apologies to those who already know this—IT/OT stands for Information Technology and Operational Technology.
IT refers to systems that manage data—like computers, networks, and email.
OT refers to systems that control physical processes—like voting machines, manufacturing equipment, or power grids.
In short: IT moves information; OT moves machinery. The two were traditionally separate, but are increasingly interconnected—which introduces new cybersecurity risks.
Key takeaways from the white paper:
Organizations often believe their systems are air-gapped when in fact they contain IT/OT convergence points—shared devices, control units, or monitoring hubs.
Even properly air-gapped systems can be penetrated through:
Insider access or vendor supply chain compromises
Misconfigured infrastructure (e.g., SNMP-enabled UPS devices)
Physical intrusion or social engineering (e.g., infected USBs)
So yes, air-gaps are imperfect and the claim “vote tabulation machines are not connected to the internet” cannot just be taken at face value. There can still be vulnerabilities. I get that.
But as the white paper makes clear, these deficiencies do not create a “wide open door” across an entire national or statewide system. For an air gap breach to occur, a lot of things have to line up: Most breaches would require either human error, an insider, or specific setup vulnerabilities in a specific situation. So while the arguments presented do move the needle from “no way” to “possibly” — I haven’t seen evidence of widespread election system designs where e-poll books and tabulators share a live data pathway and are thus vulnerable.
So what these argument seems to do is prove that it’s possible, under certain conditions, for an air gap to fail. But no one is pointing to a single verified instance where it did fail, and no one so far is presenting evidence that air gap failure was systemically engineered in voting jurisdictions nationwide. So this argument, as I understand it after doing a deep dive, moves the needle from “impossible” to “theoretically possible" under certain circumstances in certain situations but not across the board nationwide or even across swing states.
Pro V&V and the “De Minimis” Loophole
Another focal point is the claim that Pro V&V, one of two federally certified testing labs, approved updates to ES&S voting machines in the lead-up to the election that should have required full recertification but were instead waved through under a “de minimis” designation.
This is a serious charge. If significant changes to firmware or operating logic were slipped in via the “de minimis” loophole, , it would raise alarms.
Here’s what we know:
Pro V&V did approve a series of engineering change orders (ECOs) in 2024 involving ES&S machines.
According to Pro V&V, these included peripheral changes (printers, ballot bins, file directory structuring), but not tabulation logic.
The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) reviewed the claimed changes and allowed these under “de minimis” standards, which are meant to apply only to non-critical, non-functional changes.
There is no public evidence—so far—that any of these updates altered how votes were counted or tabulated.
But the concern here isn’t completely unfounded. What the author of This Will Hold argues is that even non-tabulationchanges—when coupled with potentially shared infrastructure or unsecured endpoints—can amount to latent access vectors.
That’s fair. But it’s also speculative, unless paired with direct evidence of tampering or misbehavior by the updated systems.
What’s missing here, evidentially, is evidence that would build a case that Pro V&V is a “bad actor” out to sabotage elections. Is there such evidence? No one has presented it so what we are left with seems to be the claim that changes by Pro V&V were more than inconsequential; that Pro V&V deliberately covered up those changes, and the US Election Assistance Commission participated in the scam as whell by not challenging the de minimis claim.
Is Pro V&V a “Bad Actor” in Election Sabotage?
The heart of the concern isn’t just that Pro V&V classified updates as de minimis—it’s the implication that they intentionally covered up major changes and colluded with the EAC to bypass proper scrutiny. Let’s break down what we actually know about the company and its director, Jack Cobb:
Who Is Jack Cobb?
Jack Cobb is the founder and long-time director of Pro V&V, officially recognized as a Voting System Test Laboratory (VSTL) by both the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and NIST.
He has over 16 years of experience testing voting systems and leads a lab that has been regularly audited and renewed since at least 2015.
I couldn’t find any record of political activism, public party affiliation, or evidence of partisan behavior. He isn't mentioned in political donation records or partisan news coverage.
Bottom Line
No partisan flag… yet — Cobb and Pro V&V appear to operate within federal regulatory frameworks. No ‘partisan flag’ is apparent.
No suggestion of deliberate sabotage — Their audit history, including past non-partisan reviews, supports their professional standing. They did, for example, an audit of Dominion voting machines in 2020 without any claims being made against them.
The claim appears to hing solely on motive-free assumption, not on any documented evidence of partisan intent.
If anyone can surface credible evidence—like internal communications, whistleblower complaints, or proven tampering traced to Pro V&V—I’ll be ready to re-evaluate. As of now, their actions look like compliance with standard protocol, not collusion.
Starlink as Access Layer: Real Capability or Theoretical Concern?
The original post claimed that Starlink was only connected to e-poll books—not tabulators—and that its presence was thus irrelevant. The rebuttal counters:
“Starlink’s DTC capability—enabled by the Gen2 satellite fleet and confirmed by Musk’s own documentation—bypasses traditional network routes altogether… This isn’t your average ISP connection.”
That’s technically true. Starlink’s mesh architecture does permit direct-to-cloud routing, and it can create secure, non-public data channels. That’s part of what makes it valuable in remote or military environments.
But again: capability is not the same as action. The theory needs to show that:
Starlink was connected to systems that could influence vote totals.
Someone exploited those connections during the election.
As of now, there is no forensic or testimonial evidence to establish either. And state election boards have repeatedly affirmed that vote tabulators remained offline throughout the election process. So while the rebuttal moves the needle from “impossible” to “theoretically possible” — I don’t see it moving it farther than that. More evidence is needed.
Clarkstown vs. Ramapo: A Shift in the Narrative?
The original post heavily focused on Ramapo, where five machines recorded zero votes for Kamala Harris. I investigated that and found a compelling sociological explanation: ultra-Orthodox bloc voting, with similar patterns going back at least to 2020.
The author of This Will Hold now clarifies that his claim centers not on Ramapo but Clarkstown, where such sociological patterns do not apply. He cites affidavits from voters whose ballots are “inexplicably absent or distorted.”
That deserves further investigation.
I have not yet independently verified those affidavits or compared them with machine-level data in Clarkstown. If readers can point me to credible documentation or sources, I’ll pursue it.
But absent that, we’re still in the realm of plausible—but unproven—hypothesis.
Final Thoughts
Let me end where I began. I don’t approach this as someone trying to “debunk” for sport. And I’m not here to boost fringe theories, either. I’m trying to follow the evidence where it leads—especially when the stakes are this high.
What I’ve found so far is this:
The rebuttals raise technically interesting questions about election infrastructure—but they do not, as of now, even come close to proof of manipulation. And by “proof” I’m not talking about a “beyond reasonable doubt” criminal standard — I’m just using a “more probable than not” preponderance of evidence standard and it still falls far short of getting there. Let’s say it’s in the “possibility not to be excluded” zone—worthy of further investigation, and worthy of open minded consideration.
Air gaps are imperfect, but not imaginary. In other words, they are a real thing; a real protection; but do have vulnerabilities and this should be acknowledged.
Starlink has capabilities, but no confirmed link to vote tabulation systems.
The most dramatic claim—votes missing from Kamala Harris—turns out to be explainable in Ramapo. Whether the same holds in Clarkstown remains to be seen.
I know this is frustrating, unsatisfying, because it’s inconclusive. My mind is open and I will keep looking into this.
And please — If you have credible information I should be reviewing—by all means send it. My only agenda here is to get it right.
Thank you for all the effort you are putting into this. As much as I want this theory to be true, truth and accuracy are of utmost importance. Those opposed to this administration can't just claim election fraud without incontrovertible truth... not after we pushed back so hard on Republican fraud claims in 2020. Truth matters. We must never stoop to the level of these opponents.
In Fauquier county, Virginia we have manual procedures in place to test the validity of the election results. By law, this should be true throughout all of Virginia. Before election day, we perform logic and accuracy testing, where a test deck is run through the tabulators with valid and invalid ballots, and we test to see that only valid ballots are counted, and that the results are what we expect them to be. This test is very extensive and takes many hours to run. After the election, a risk limiting audit is performed where a statistical sample of the ballots are pulled from the machines and counted to see that the results of that hand count matches the machine count. There are usually a few ballots that were not counted by the machine because it could not read them and that is the discrepancies that we actually find. The number of uncounted ballots is usually well under 1%. Any close election can be contested by the losing candidate and a recount performed. in the recount, the machine are set to even tighter tolerances than they were on election day and all “rejected“ ballots are hand inspected, and if “the voters clear intent“ is discernible,
they will be counted.