'Spy Dust' - New Russian Documentary Details My Arrest and Expulsion from Moscow on Espionage Charges in 1986
CIA Mole Aldrish Ames was the source who compromised me and my Soviet Agent, Major Sergey Vorontsov of the KGB Second Chief Directorate
Author’s note — as we dig deeper into Trump/KGB in the 1980s, it occurred to me that it might be a good idea to share one of my personal experiences from Moscow 1986 in which I was arrested by the KGB while holding a clandestine meeting with KGB major Sergei Vorontsov, known to us by his cryptonym GTC0WL It would later be established that I had the misfortue of being the first America to be captured in the act of espionage as a result of the disclosures to KGB of CIA ‘mole’ Aldrich Ames. I would be arrested, held briefly, then expelled. Sergei Vorontsov would be executed.
Following is a magazine style adaptation of the 2024 Russian language documentary ‘Spy Dust'‘ which tells the story mostly from the KGB point of view. The 'title ‘Spy Dust’ refers to a chemical tracking powder use by the KGB to track CIA officer. Vorontsov provided a sample to me at an earlier meeting,, and this figured prominently in the KGB investigation. Here is a link to the Russian Documentary; Шпионская пыль. Охота КГБ на неуловимого агента западных спецслужб. Below is an English translation of the documentary, with still frames from the film.
“Spy Dust” — The Documentary
Written by Alexander Elbayev
Directed by Julia Satarova
In April 1985 in Cold War Moscow, two men walked through a secluded park. CIA officer Michael Sellers, 32, discreetly pulled a sealed envelope and passed it to his partner. In response, his partner, KGB CounterIntelligence Officer Sergey Vorontsov, 37, pulled a small bottle from his pocket, sprayed its contents into a clear plastic bag, and handed it to the American. Inside that plastic bag was something that would ignite a firestorm in the global press as well as within the Soviet intelligence community—an unknown substance later dubbed “Spy Dust.”
For nearly a year and a half, Soviet counterintelligence would mount a relentless hunt for the KGB officer who handed Sellers the Spy Dust. He was an elusive double agent buried deep within the KGB’s own ranks. Known to his American handlers as “Cowl,” this man—codenamed “Two-Faced Poison” by the KGB—was responsible for some of the most damaging intelligence leaks of the era. His betrayal reached the highest levels of Soviet intelligence, placing his family, his career, and his own life on the line.
As the KGB’s search for this mole dragged on without concrete results, doubts began to creep in. “We began to wonder if we would ever find him,” recalls retired KGB officer Sergei Terekhov. The treachery of Cowl cut deep, as it wasn’t just the betrayal of country, but of family. “He betrayed his mother, brother, father—everyone,” laments a retired KGB officer.
Meanwhile, in the shadows of Moscow, CIA officer Michael Sellers was playing his own dangerous game, knowing all too well the risks involved. “When I saw the yellow color, I immediately knew—it was spy dust,” he recalls.
The Spy Dust Scandal Breaks
The mid 1980s saw an escalation of tension between the superpowers, with the United States and the Soviet Union once again teetering on the brink of nuclear conflict. President Ronald Reagan famously summed up the moment with a simple yet ominous declaration: “The reality is that we must come to peace through strength.” As the world held its breath, the summer of 1985 would add fuel to the fire—not with military might, but through the explosive revelation of a Cold War scandal.
In August of that year, the US Government announced with great fanfare that Soviet intelligence was tracking American diplomats using a special powder that, according to the Americans, was carcinogenic and thus a grave threat to the health of all Americans in Moscow. American newspapers splashed sensational headlines across their pages, claiming that the KGB had developed a toxic, deadly substance designed to spy on Western diplomats. The media buzz quickly coined a name for this nefarious tool—Spy Dust.
The stories were not simply journalistic exaggerations. The Soviet intelligence apparatus, the State Security Committee (KGB), did indeed possess such a substance. “Spy Dust,” as it was known in the West, was referred to within the KGB by its codename: Rubin. It was a high-tech tracking powder that could be applied to clothing, shoes, car upholstery, or even door handles. Once applied, it left a trace that could be followed using special equipment, allowing the KGB to map the movements of their targets with startling precision. If a CIA officer, dusted with “Rubin”, shook hands with a Russian citizen or opened the door to his flat — traces of Spy Dust would remain.
“The drug was a marker,” explains a former KGB officer. “If you applied it to a person’s belongings, you could track their entire route and who they communicated with.”
The KGB had always taken great pains to keep Rubin’s existence a secret. For it to be exposed so publicly in the Western press meant only one thing: someone within their own ranks had handed it over to the Americans.
“We had a mole,” says retired KGB officer Vladimir Skorik. The question was, who?
Aldrich Ames and the Hunt for the Mole
Even before the Spy Dust scandal broke in the press, the KGB had an inkling that something was deeply amiss within their counterintelligence operations. In the spring of 1985, the CIA’s Aldrich Ames had made contact with the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Ames was not just any spy—he was the head of the CIA’s Soviet counterintelligence division, a man with unparalleled access to the inner workings of American intelligence.
“When Ames came forward, it seemed too good to be true,” Skorik recalls. “He possessed colossal and most interesting information for us—about intelligence aspirations, development targets in the CIA. Without a doubt, he was one of the most productive sources we ever had.”
And Ames delivered. On April 16, 1985, he provided Soviet handlers with a list of American agents who had successfully infiltrated the KGB. Among the first to be identified were two Soviet operatives—Valery Martynov and Sergei Motorin. Careful observation by Soviet authorities confirmed Ames’ information: both men were indeed working for the CIA.
Ames’ undetected betrayal sent invisible shockwaves through CIA operations. The effect was not immediate, but over a period of months, agents began to go missing, and other anomalies began to crop up. The CIA sensed something was wrong, but what?
For the Soviets, it was the beginning of counterintelligence glory days . “Ames allowed us to uncover a whole network of American agents inside our intelligence services,” says espionage historian Andrey Bednev. “Before that, no one even suspected that such a network existed.”
One item on Ames’ list, however, stood out. He supplied true names and code names for all but one. That one existed only as a code name — Cowl — and Cowl remained a mystery. The Americans knew little about this agent aside from his place of work: the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB, the elite counterintelligence unit responsible for defending the Soviet Union from foreign espionage. “Only the best of the best could get there,” Bednev explains. The selection process for KGB officers was, by all accounts, grueling. For the Second Chief Directorate,
“They selected a hundred people,” recalls retired KGB officer Valentin Sobol. “Ten were retained, and ten of them were then checked and put through further trials. The people who made it through were not just intelligent—they were loyal, and their IQ was well above average.”
For Soviet counterintelligence, unmasking Cowl became a matter of honor. A special investigative team was formed under the highest levels of secrecy, and the operation was given a telling name—Two-Faced Poison. At the helm of the operation was General Vitaly Boyarov, deputy head of the Second Chief Directorate. To spearhead the day-to-day investigation, Boyarov turned to Major Sergei Terekhov, a rising star in Soviet counterintelligence with a reputation for discretion and results.
Sergei Stepanovich Terekhov, born in 1953, was no stranger to the shadowy world of espionage. After graduating from the KGB Higher School, he had been serving in counterintelligence since 1976. Over the course of his career, he had made several clandestine trips to Kyiv and participated in secret operations outside the Soviet Union. His achievements had earned him prestigious honors, including the Knight of the Order of the Red Star and the Red Banner of Labor—distinctions reserved for only the most accomplished officers.
The call to lead the investigation was unexpected, even for someone of Terekhov’s caliber. “I was called by the first deputy chief of the country’s counterintelligence,” Terekhov recalls. “I immediately thought back to everything I might have done wrong. But then I walked in, and they were all sitting there, and the operation began, led by Vitaly Konstantinovich Boyarov.”
It was only then that Terekhov learned the gravity of the situation: there was a mole deep within the central apparatus, inside the very heart of Soviet counterintelligence—the Second Chief Directorate.
As Terekhov dug deeper, the pressure mounted. The KGB knew they had a mole inside their ranks—someone who had access to some of the most sensitive information in the Soviet Union. But who? And how long would it take before he struck again?
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The CIA Through the Eyes of the KGB
To monitor and control the CIA in Moscow was the number one objective of the KGB’s Second Chief Directorate. The CIA’s activities in the Soviet Union followed a predictable but elusive pattern. CIA operatives entered the country under various covers—posing as journalists, travelers, or businessmen. But the most secure—and often the most effective—guise was that of a diplomat, who could operate under the protection of diplomatic immunity.
The operatives working under diplomatic cover converged on a single location: the US Embassy, located at Building 21 on what was then called Tchaikovsky Street, now Novinsky Boulevard. The embassy was the nerve center of CIA operations in the USSR, something the KGB understood all too well.
“The top floors were where the espionage activity happened,” recalls retired KGB officer Victor Pesok. “That place was the lair of their intelligence activities.” According to Pesok, the embassy was equipped with sophisticated surveillance technology. “There was wiretapping of telephones and telephone cables, and there was serious equipment on the roof. At first, it was open, but later they concealed it from prying eyes.”
Given the embassy’s role, it understandably became the focus of KGB counterintelligence surveillance. Teams of operatives were constantly on duty around the building, monitoring the comings and goings of embassy staff. “Observation was conducted from various points around the city,” says Pesok. “Naturally, they knew we were watching and trained themselves to avoid surveillance.”
For CIA operatives, an assignment in Moscow was a badge of honor—a testament to their skills as intelligence officers. The Soviet Union was infamous for its strict counterintelligence environment, and only the most talented CIA agents were sent there. Retired KGB officer Valentin Sobol agrees: “Those who worked in Moscow considered themselves the elite. They were right. The Soviet Union had a very strict counterintelligence regime, and the people who operated here were highly valued for their capabilities and experience.”
Michael Sellers—the “Artistic” CIA Officer
One of those elite officers was Michael Sellers, a promising young CIA operative. In 1984, Sellers arrived in Moscow, officially under the guise of the second secretary at the US Embassy. Born in 1954, Sellers was first recruited into the CIA while studying film at New York University. He trained at the agency’s secretive Virginia facility, known as “The Farm.” Over the course of his ten-year career, he conducted covert operations in Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Philippines, and he spoke fluent Russian—an invaluable skill in his line of work.
But Sellers’ cover was far from impenetrable. The KGB quickly identified him as a CIA officer and began closely tracking his movements. Over time, they developed a clear picture of his methods and his role within the agency. “We knew he was with the Central Intelligence Agency, and we followed his professional progress closely,” one former KGB officer recalls.
In the eyes of the KGB, Sellers stood out among CIA operatives for his creativity and flair. “He was the most artistic of all the CIA agents,” said Rem Krasilnikov, a legendary Soviet counterintelligence figure who headed the ‘Second Chief Directorate’s American Department throughout the 1980s. Sellers, it seemed, had a flair for performance, blending his espionage work with a love for the arts. He frequented Moscow’s theaters and concerts, played guitar, and even released a record album in the United States.
Krasilnikov believed Sellers’ artistry was more than just a hobby—it was an integral part of his tradecraft. Sellers had a reputation for being a master of disguise and transformation, using it to escape detection by the KGB when going operational.
“He was quite the actor,” says Sobol. “There were many examples of his use of disguise. Sometimes he used inflatable mannequins. Other times he would make himself up to look like another American diplomat—matching clothes, wigs, the whole package. The Americans used this disguise technique a lot. Sellers learned it well as a cadet at the CIA school and put it to good use.”
According to KGB assessment, Sellers’ charismatic personality was another tool in his espionage kit. He was a sociable and easygoing diplomat, capable of slipping into any social situation and winning people’s trust effortlessly. His own description of his work as a CIA operative was less about espionage and more about theater. “I actually thought of what I did in Moscow as a kind of theatrical performance,” Sellers later reflected. “Because I was always under surveillance. And when you’re under surveillance, you’re performing a role for them. You’re trying to convey the story you want to tell. My story was that I was very happy to be in Moscow, and that I loved and respected Russian culture.”
By the time Sellers had been in Moscow for several months, the KGB had built up a detailed profile of his movements and activities. But as Sellers was perfecting his performance, something unexpected occurred. In late 1984, the CIA received a tantalizing offer: a Soviet counterintelligence officer was ready to provide his services as an informant. That officer’s name was Sergei Vorontsov, and his decision to turn against the KGB would set the stage for one of the Cold War’s most gripping intelligence dramas.
To be continued . . .
Wow, amazing to have the tale told by the Russians. Respect, Sir! Ames sounds like a nasty piece of work- as I understand it, his motivation was purely mercenary rather than ideological.
Great story Michael. You even had a full head of hair, back then. I was in college, so you definitely have a few years on me. Moreover, you definitely looked the part of spy; the “trench” coat was a sure giveaway. I thought was only used in the movies; way too obvious.
That said, although Ames was definitely detrimental to the CIA during his decade of treason, he never would have existed, if not for the stupidity of everyone’s favorite spymaster, James Angleton.
Furthermore, Angleton, as head of the CIA’s counterintelligence unit, saw treason at every turn. Angelton was to the CIA, as Senator Joe McCarthy was to the State Department, and US government. A man obsessed with Soviet moles; ultimately doing more harm than good; see Kim Philby.
Furthermore, the CIA was still doing decades of damage control from Angelton, when Ames came on to the scene. Otherwise, he never would have been as successful, for so long.
Either way, people died, and missions and agents were compromised; putting all our espionage and counterintelligence operations in jeopardy.
If anything, the entire affair should serve as a harbinger of bad things to come. Trump firing an entire class of new agents, whose only crime is that they we’re on probation, while we’re stuck with the Manchurian President, hell bent on turning America into Russia; the worlds largest gas station with nukes.
Or in our case; our National Security Apparatus has been completely neutered, and incapable of even an original thought. IMHO..:)