Federal Ruling: A Deeper Look at What Judge Charles Breyer Said in His Ruling

I’ve just finished reading the full ruling issued today by Judge Charles R. Breyer in Newsom v. Trump—the case challenging President Trump’s federalization of the California National Guard. The ruling temporarily blocks the deployment of those troops in Los Angeles and orders control returned to Governor Gavin Newsom. Constitutional scholars will parse it and I won’t try to do that, but here’s a careful summary of the key points. You can read the full ruling here

1. Citing More Detailed Facts Than the Press is Reporting, He Shows the Protests Were Limited in Scope and Contained in Scale Before Trump’s Order, Then Escalated After the Order

Before addressing the legal claims, Judge Breyer lays out a detailed factual record. His summary, based on sworn declarations, reporting, and government filings, stands in contrast to the sweeping language used by federal officials in recent days.

The numbers are instructive. According to the facts as gathered by the court, the largest protest prior to the order federalizing the guard, which took place near the Metropolitan Detention Center, drew about 2,500 people. Other protests in Paramount and Compton ranged from 300 to 400 participants. Breyer makes it clear using facts that are not in dispute that the protests prior to Trump’s order were not citywide uprisings, but rather concentrated protests in a few locations.

During the initial protests on June 6 and 7, a limited number of individuals within the protest engaged in violence—throwing bottles, setting small fires, damaging property—but the scale remained limited. Notably, in the entire period before the National Guard was federalized on the evening of June 7, 29 individuals were arrested. After the order, crowds grew larger and more unruly — leading to arrests of 41 on June 8, 135 on June 9, and 297 on June 10—bringing the total to over 400. This sequence supports one of Breyer’s broader concerns: that the presence of federalized military forces appears to have inflamed tensions rather than defused them.

This fact pattern frames the rest of the ruling. It depicts no breakdown of civil order. Rather it depicts a significant protest with a sub-element of violent “bad actors” — but not a massive, widespread protest and certainly not an organized rebellion. Also, he notes that. neither party is claiming that any of the protesters were armed. In sum, Breyer meticulously presents an episode of localized protest, largely contained by local authorities, and significantly smaller in scale than government claims might suggest — which blew up into something larger (but still not massive) after the provocative action was taken by Trump.

2. Breyer Examines and then Dismantles the Claim of “Rebellion”

The legal basis for President Trump’s order rested on 10 U.S.C. § 12406, a statute that permits the federalization of a state’s National Guard in only three narrow scenarios: When there is invasion (or danger thereof); when there is a rebellion or danger therof, or when there is inability to execute federal law with regular forces.

The administration primarily invoked the “rebellion” clause. Breyer’s ruling addresses this claim directly—and decisively.

He begins by examining the term rebellion in its proper historical context. Drawing on early 20th-century legal dictionaries—contemporaneous with the 1903 statute—Breyer identifies the core attributes of a rebellion:

• It must be armed,

• It must be organized,

• It must be open and avowed,

• And it must be aimed at overthrowing the government as a whole, not merely protesting a law or disrupting an agency’s operations.

By contrast, an insurrection can refer to opposition to a specific law or authority. But § 12406 does not authorize the President to act based on an insurrection—it requires the far graver standard of rebellion.

Measured against this standard, Breyer finds that the events in Los Angeles fall far short. While some protesters committed acts of violence, there was no organization, no firearms, and no evidence that any group was attempting to overthrow the government. The protests were aimed at immigration enforcement—not at dismantling the U.S. government or replacing it.

Breyer is particularly cautious about the implications of labeling protests as rebellion. Doing so, he writes, would risk collapsing the distinction between protected dissent and unlawful insurrection, with serious consequences for constitutional rights.

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3. A Strong Reaffirmation of First Amendment Doctrine

To reinforce this point, Breyer turns to a robust line of First Amendment precedent.

He cites cases including NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., Cox v. Louisiana, and Tinker v. Des Moines, all of which affirm a critical constitutional principle: the misconduct of a few individuals within a protest does not strip the entire gathering of its First Amendment protections.

This is not a new doctrine. Courts have long held that when a protest turns partially unruly, the state may take action against those who break the law—but may not use isolated disorder to suppress broader political expression. As Breyer puts it, "Violence is necessary for a rebellion, but it is not sufficient."

Even where tensions rise and law enforcement is challenged, the rights of peaceful demonstrators remain intact. To conflate their actions with “rebellion,” he warns, would not only misapply the statute—it would chill legitimate political activity and undermine foundational protections.

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4. Procedural and Constitutional Failures

Even if the facts had justified federal action—and they did not—Breyer finds that the President’s team failed to follow the statutory procedure laid out in § 12406.

That provision requires that federalization orders be issued “through the governor” of the state. But Governor Newsom was not consulted, not notified, and not included. The administration later argued that labeling the order “THROUGH: THE GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA” satisfied the requirement—but Breyer rejects that argument. The statute requires actual coordination with the Governor, not a heading on a memo.

The ruling also points to broader constitutional concerns. By removing 4,000 members of the California National Guard from state control—without proper legal authorization—the federal government deprived the state of critical resources used for wildfire response, drug interdiction, and public safety.

This, Breyer concludes, amounts to a violation of the Tenth Amendment, which reserves core “police powers” to the states. Those powers include the

authority to manage civil unrest and deploy a state’s own National Guard. When that power is taken without meeting the legal thresholds set by Congress, the constitutional balance is upset.

Concluding Comments

It’s well worth the time to read the entire ruling. Again, here’s the link.

I’ll just also mention that in my “day job” as an investigator and mitigation specialist, I’ve had a number of cases in front of Judge Breyer, who is the younger brother of former Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, He is someone who those of us who labor in the 9th Circuit federal legal environment know well as a very sharp analyst and always fairminded. This time he did not disappoint. The case now moves to a preliminary injunction hearing set for June 20. But this first ruling lays down a foundation—and a warning—about the legal and constitutional limits on federal power during times of domestic protest.