Escape to Moscow: The Inside Story of How the CIA's First Defector Was Fired, Became a KGB Agent, then Defected to the USSR
An Excerpt From Year of the Spy
Author’s note: I had the curious distinction of sharing an office at CIA Heaquarters with the CIA’s first defector, Edward Lee Howard. We were both slated to go to Moscow, and we occupied what was known as the “pipeliner” office on the USSR Branch — pipeliner being the term used to describe case officers who were going through the extensive training and preparation the Agency required for officers headed to Moscow. A few weeks before he was scheduled to leave, on May 2, 1983, he was summarily fired by CIA and sent on a trajectory what would eventually see him volunteer his services to the KGB and defect to the USSR. Here are two chapters exerpted from the CIA-authorized manuscript of Year of the Spy.
The CIA Fires Ed Howard
Two months after Reagan delivered the Evil Empire speech, CIA officer Edward Lee Howard kicked himself for his stupidity as he sat waiting for a polygraph operator whom he thought of as “The Hammer” to enter the room and hook him up for what would be the fourth polygraph exam in the last six weeks.
At thirty-two, Howard was five feet eleven inches tall, a hundred seventy pounds, with dark hair and conservative appearance. As the son of an Air Force Sergeant he had grown up on military bases around the world, then had gone on to become a cum laude graduate of the University of Texas before going on to an MBA from American University with a concentration in finance. He had then served in the Peace Corps and USAID in Peru and Colombia before joining CIA in 1980. To the world he looked and acted like a low-key, forgettable bureaucrat – however, his wife Mary would later say that he saw himself, in fact, as a “John Wayne type.”
Once, when applying for a job, he described himself as a “very intense planner, very methodical, and had been told by his co- workers that he was at times too devious in his approach to obtaining his objective.” In admitting this, he stated to the interviewer that while others might consider it a flaw, he felt he was able to utilize it to advantage.
At CIA, his performance in training had been unremarkable but his MBA in Finance had brought him to the attention of SE Division management, who were looking for a first tour officer with credible finance credentials to occupy a new deep cover slot in a U.S. Government Budget and Fiscal office in Moscow. By May of 1983 Howard was near the end of the Moscow “pipeline” – having completed language training, Internal Operations Training, and various other specialized preparation for Moscow.
But there was a problem. That problem: the polygraph.
Howard would later write that he had brought this problem on himself by proactively inquiring about a polygraph instead of just leaving well enough alone. The whole ridiculous situation had begun when he heard that all officers heading for a communist duty post had to be polygraphed before leaving. He was due to arrive in Moscow in June 1983, and as time passed and no one said anything about a polygraph, he had begun to fret about it and finally, on the theory that it was better to get it over with than have somebody suddenly remember at the last minute that he was due for one, he had called the Office of Security and reminded them that he was heading for Moscow, and was due for a re-investigation polygraph.
What a mistake.
If he had known there were issues that might cause it to go less than smoothly, he would have thought twice. But as he saw it, there was nothing that should derail him. True, he had not fully lived up to the code of conduct expected of a CIA officer. But his sins were venal, not mortal. Surely there was nothing that could derail his assignment to Moscow.
The first session had gone smoothly enough. In it, he had admitted to some minor drug and alcohol issues, nothing very heavy, in his view.
The next day he received a call that a follow-up was needed. The polygraph examiner told him, gently it seemed, that there might have been an indication of deception on crime.
Did Ed have any idea what that might be about?
Howard knew how the polygraph process worked. It was, in truth, an interrogation tool, designed to coax or coerce confessions.
The polygrapher went over the questions with you in advance, before you were hooked up to the machine. Have you had contact with any hostile intelligence service? Have you used drugs? Have you stolen anything? You responded to each question during the pre-test, and if a clarification was needed, you gave it then. If the question was -- have you stolen anything, and into your head pops the fact that you stole your brother’s baseball glove when you were eight -- you confess to that. The question then becomes: “Other than your brother’s baseball glove, have you ever stolen anything?”
On the question of crime, Howard thought -- hell, they’ve been teaching me to do nothing but commit crimes in Russia for the last thirty months.
So he told that to the polygraph examiner, and then they did the test.
It didn’t work. The examiner wasn’t satisfied. “Is there anything else?”
There was something else that was popping into his head. It was stupid really. Incredibly stupid. And embarrassing. But it was minor, so surely it wouldn’t be a big deal.
“Yeah, I think so.”
“Okay. Tell me.”
“On an airplane trip last year a woman in front of me kept moving her seat forward and backward. I politely asked her to stop. She became indignant and made a scene. When she got up to go to the bathroom, I slid her purse out from under her seat and took her cash. It was less than $50. I didn’t want her money – I just wanted her to arrive at her destination without any cash. It was stupid. But she deserved to be punished, so I punished her.”
The examiner was impassive. He wrote down what Howard had said.
“Okay. Is that all?”
“Yes.”
They then repeated the test, and Howard was confident that with that clarification in place, he didn’t react to the question.
But the ordeal wasn’t finished. They wanted a third test.
The third poly was when they had brought in “The Hammer.”
The Hammer was 100% drill Sergeant. In a military command voice, he told Howard: “Sit down. Face front. Don’t look at me. Don’t look to the side.”
Then the pre-test questions. “Have you taken drugs today?” “Yes.”
Howard thought the Hammer looked like he was going to take a swing at him.
“What kind of drugs?”
“Librium. I have a prescription.”
“I ought to just toss your ass out and make you come back on Monday. You know damned well that could invalidate the exam.”
“Sorry. It’s prescription medication.”
More questions about drinking, and drugs. Howard gave the same answers he had given previously. He knew he had some vulnerabilities there, but nothing, he was confident, that was any worse than half the people walking around Headquarters. Especially the drinking. And the drugs had been very minor.
Eventually the examiner went forward with the exam.
The examiner studied the printout, then spoke noncommittally. “You’re free to go.”
Howard waited anxiously for the results.
Eventually another call came from the office of security. One more exam.
And here he was, waiting for it.
To Howard’s surprise, this time The Hammer was on his best behavior. He went over the questions in advance; Howard gave his answers; then they did the test.
The Hammer looked pleased as he examined the readout. “All right, this looks good.”
And that was it.
The Hammer reached out, offering a handshake, smiling. Howard took the examiner’s hand and shook it, then left.
On the way home he stopped and bought a few bottles of good champagne and some cold cuts -- nothing like champagne and zakuskie to get in the mood for Moscow. That night, he toasted and drank with his wife Mary and her mother and father, who were visiting.
Six more weeks and they would be in Moscow. Then came Monday, May 2, 1983.
He passed the morning quietly in the cubicle on the Soviet Division’s USSR Branch that he shared with another outgoing Moscow pipeliner, Michael Sellers. Unlike Howard who was scheduled for a June 1983 departure date, Sellers was part of a group of outgoing officers scheduled for a summer of 1984 arrival.
Sellers and Howard had both just become first-time fathers, and they joked about changing diapers, lack of sleep, and the challenge of taking an infant to Moscow. They also chatted about CKSPHERE (who would later be known as GTVANQUISH), the big case in Moscow for which Howard was slated to be the primary handler. There was a security scare going on at the institute where Sphere was a research engineer, and Sphere feared for his life. Hopefully it would pass.
In the afternoon, the phone rang.
It was the office of personnel, asking Howard if he could stop by. “Can it wait until tomorrow?” Howard asked. “I’ve got in-laws in
town and I need to get home early.”
No, they said.
We need you to stop by now.
He knew something was up as soon as he entered the personnel office. There were two clean-cut, athletic types there -- obviously from the office of security. They met him at the entrance and escorted him to a room where an uncomfortable personnel officer delivered the news.
“Mr. Howard, we’re going to need your resignation.”
Howard would later contend that he was never given any explanation for why he was being fired. There was, according to Howard, no discussion of drugs or alcohol, and the incident on the plane was not mentioned.
Howard signed the papers that were put in front of him. They would pay his salary through June. Other than that, he was dismissed, effective immediately.
The two security men escorted him back to the USSR branch, which was empty except for Tom Mills, the Branch Chief, who silently watched him gather up his few belongings. A few minutes later, under scrutiny of the men from security, he quietly left the building for the last time.
* * * * *
Later, when Howard would become the first CIA officer to defect to the Soviets, a key question would be – did Howard’s plan to contact the Soviets only coalesce in his mind after he was fired? Or did the idea arise earlier and if so, did he remove classified information from CIA in preparation for contact with the Soviets?
The preponderance of evidence suggests that Howard prepared and removed material prior to his dismissal.
It is certain, for example, that Howard Xeroxed and removed the photocopied image of his CIA access badge, and used that to assist in establishing his bona fides with the Soviets. Whether he did it on the last day, or at an earlier point is unclear. He did not have an opportunity to do it after being dismissed, as he was under scrutiny continuously from that point. He must have done it prior to receiving final word that he was dismissed.
But what about other notes, documents, records?
Howard would later tell a confidante that he had smuggled notes including identities of agents and other key operational information out of CIA and “buried it” before his dismissal. Was this bravado? Or had he really done it? The absolute truth is not known. But what is known, for certain, is that on multiple occasions Howard stated that he had removed key classified information from CIA prior to being fired.
The Soviets would say that his information did not include the names of agents – but this too is possibly self-serving disinformation.15
One thing was clear.
Ed Howard’s CIA career was over almost before it began. But his career as a spy was just beginning.
Author’s Note: In August 1985, KGB officer Vitaly Yurchenko would defect to CIA in Rome. During his first debriefing, he revealed that a CIA officer, known to him as “Mister Robert,” had volunteered services to the KGB after having been summarily fired just before going to Moscow. It was instantly understood that this was Ed Howard. Howard at that time was living in Albuquerque, New Mexico. An FBI investigation was mounted, and Howard was placed under surveillance. However, Howard had been trained to detect and manipulate surveillance, and that capability would become a major part of the story.
Howard Escapes
James H. Geer, the assistant FBI director for counterintelligence selected Philip A. Parker, his division’s deputy director for operations, to spearhead the Howard effort. Parker had worked counterintelligence for most of his 20-year career.
Parker coordinated with William Branon, the newly arrived head of the Albuquerque field office, who was directly in charge of the “Trumphet” – the code named given to the operation.
On August 29, 1985, the FBI initiated surveillance of Howard. Due to Howard’s history with weapons, Albuquerque personnel were supported by Special Operations Group (SOG) officers trained to handle armed suspects, and because of his special training by CIA, the operation was also supported by Special Surveillance Group (SSG) members from Los Angeles who were at least theoretically familiar with the techniques that Howard had been taught by CIA. The initial surveillance was scheduled to run from 7:00 a.m. until Howard went to bed. This pattern continued until September 18, 1985, when 24 hour surveillance overage was instituted. 120 The mode of surveillance was intentionally “discreet” – meaning it was intended to be accomplished without the subject becoming aware of its existence. In addition to vehicles, a fixed wing aircraft was used.121
In Washington, Jack Platt, the head of the SE Division Internal Operations course who had trained Howard in how to beat surveillance, made sure the FBI got an accurate picture of Howard’s skills. He urged with FBI to dispatch the Washington “G’s” — the specially trained force that knew the tricks Howard had been taught. Platt was convinced that when the time came, Howard would be able to defeat any “regular” surveillance the FBI might attempt. Only the G’s could outthink and outwit the man that Platt had trained to operate in Moscow.
There were, in fact, members of the FBI Special Surveillance Group – the “G’s” – involved in the surveillance. But the SSG’s were from Los Angeles, not Washington; and unlike the Washington team, they were not experienced in tracking CIA officers headed for Moscow.
From a legal perspective, the FBI needed more on Howard before they could arrest him. They had to prove all three legs of he espionage statute -- that he knowingly passed classified information; that he did so with intent to harm the United States; and that he received remuneration for the information. Yurchenko’s tip, while compelling, was not enough. Yurchenko had no direct knowledge of Howard; didn’t know his name, couldn’t describe him.
Meanwhile, mounting discreet surveillance on Howard in the wide open spaces of Santa Fe, New Mexico, was not an easy task. In its after-the-fact administrative inquiry into the Ed Howard operation, the report notes the difficulties presented by the Howard residence:
The surveillance of Howard's residence was extremely difficult, inasmuch as the house was in a subdivision located in a desert area with very open terrain. Agents could not conduct the surveillance from stationary vehicles since the subdivision was patrolled by security guards and the neighbors would, in all probability, become suspicious of any strange vehicles. After unsuccessful efforts to locate a residence to utilize as a surveillance site, an unmanned van, equipped with CCTV, was placed across the street and video transmissions were microwaved a short distance to a monitoring station, which consisted of a recreation vehicle (RV) staffed with one Agent. The RV, which was code named "Bell Tower" was equipped with a TV monitor and video cassette recorder. The monitoring Agent also had a secure radio available to communicate with surveillance teams who were assembled close to the exits of the subdivision. A telephone was available to maintain contact with the case Agent assigned to the Santa Fe RA, as well as to communicate with Albuquerque Division Headquarters, which was 70 miles away.
Clearly, the setup was not perfect. The officer in Bell Tower, using 1980’s quality CCTV cameras being fed via microwave from the van, was the only “eye” on the target. The surveillance teams could not visually observe the house, nor could they position themselves at the chokepoints at entrances and exits to the subdivision without becoming obvious to local traffic, which was light and was composed primarily of residents.
A wiretap yielded nothing more than minor operational information -- nothing incriminating was ever said. Howard was too disciplined to give anything up over the phone. Additionally, a request for authorization to place a beeper on Howard’s car had been forwarded to the Justice Department in mid August, but the Justice Department attorney responsible for dealing with it was on annual leave and only returned on September 13. It then languished without action being taken as the officer worked through the various items that had accumulated during his annual leave.124
The surveillance of Howard was carried out in what the FBI would later describe as “discreet, intelligence gathering mode, attempting to determine his routines and any actions.” Few anomalies were noted. One unusual event was noted and occurred on September 10:
. . . on the evening of September 10, 1985, HOWARD departed his house and drove to a highway, approximately two miles away. He then proceeded along this highway for approximately one mile and turned onto a small, dirt road. He travelled approximately one mile and stopped. He then turned around and retraced his steps to the highway, then went to the junction of the highway where he originally entered this highway and made a telephone call. It is not known to whom this telephone call was made; however, en route to his home after the call, he pulled off to the side of the road and turned off his lights as if he were trying to determine if he was under surveillance.
As the discreet surveillance of Howard continued, officials became increasingly concerned that he had “made” the surveillance and was therefore alerted to the investigation. Meanwhile, the FBI had a lead to former CIA officer William Bosch, an associate of Howard’s who lived on Padre Island, Texas.
On September 18, in Washington, with a growing awareness that the discreet surveillance had almost certainly alerted Howard, the FBI confirmed that “no warrant for his arrest was authorized by the Justice Department.” A meeting was then held attended by key players in the investigation from the FBI, plus representatives of the DOJ and CIA. At this meeting it was decided that since Howard had almost certainly made surveillance and was aware he was under scrutiny, the next step would be to conduct a confrontation interview with Howard as soon as possible. The confrontation interview technique frequently was successful -- and in fact had been successful very recently with Ronald Pelton, an NSA employee who had been tipped to the CIA by Yurchenko. Maybe it would work with Howard. The ground rules for the interview included that if at any point in the interview Howard requested an attorney, the interview must be terminated.
At 2PM on the 19th, the FBI called Howard at work and requested that he come to the lobby of the Hilton Hotel in Santa Fe, which was near his office. Howard sounded concerned but agreed, and went to the Hilton Inn, arriving in the lobby at 2:15. Agents met him there and took him to Room 327 for an interview. At the outset, Howard was told that he was being interviewed regarding is possible cooperation with Soviet intelligence, and that a “KGB defector in London” furnished information about him.
Howard adamantly denied any contact with Soviet intelligence and complained that the CIA was obviously out to get him. After twenty minutes of questions that at times involved heated exchanges, Howard claimed that the FBI was denying him his rights and said that he wanted to consult with an attorney. He was then told that it was his right to consult an attorney and he was free to leave, but then as he was about to walk out, one of the agent’s told him that if he walked away, the FBI would be forced to start a full scale investigation including immediate interviews of his wife, associates, employer, and relatives.
Howard sat back down.
The interview would continue.
However, because Howard had expressed a desire to speak to an attorney, FBI agents had to shift tactics – they could no longer attempt to extract a confession or discuss the substance of the case. To do so would violate Howard’s rights. Instead, they shifted to an attempt to convince Howard to take a polygraph at a later date. Howard adamantly refused, pointing out he had already been “screwed” by the CIA polygraph exams.
It is almost certain that Howard, who had been warned by the Soviets in August that a defector might compromise him; and who had almost certainly made his surveillance, was by September 19 well on his way toward formulating a plan to escape the FBI. And it is against this backdrop that his next actions must be viewed.
After first responding angrily and saying he would never take a polygraph, Howard calmed, and allowed as how perhaps he would do so, simply to get the FBI off his back. Was this change in position real? Or was it, as seems more likely, the first step toward his escape—an attempt to begin lulling the FBI with a promise of cooperation?
The FBI did not immediately take the bait.
Howard said he would consider the polygraph, but wanted to consult his attorney. He agreed to give the FBI his decision by Saturday, September 21, 1985.
Not good enough, was the reply. The FBI insisted he make a decision before departing the interview.
At this, Howard became irate and stated he would not make a move without talking to his attorney, and the FBI could do whatever it wanted, including searching his house.
FBI agents produced a “Consent to Search” form and asked Howard to sign it. Howard refused and angrily walked out of the interview.
Before he left, the lead interview agent told Howard he would be available in Room 327 on the following morning, September 20, and gave Howard and FBI office contact number.
The effort was an apparent bust — for the most part, confrontation interviews either worked or they didn’t; delayed favorable reactions were unlikely. Howard had resisted all efforts to pressure him, and was surly and uncooperative. And now, after the interview, he was even more alerted that the FBI was onto him than he had been previously.
The situation was urgent.
After consultation with FBI Headquarters, Parker gave the order that the next time Howard left his residence, he would be surrounded by close, overt surveillance--a show of force designed to intimidate and, in a practical sense, to make it all but impossible for Howard to bolt. Four cars would “bumper-lock” Howard, providing what amounted to an FBI escort everywhere he went.
With new instructions in hand, surveillance settled in for the long overnight shift and prepared for what the next day would bring.
The next day, Friday, September 20, Howard left Verrano Loop a little after 8am and quickly found himself surrounded by four FBI vehicles that boxed him in on all sides. With this embarrassing entourage surrounding him, he went to work for the morning, then after lunch told co-workers he had a doctor’s appointment and left the office. He picked up Mary at home, then with his watchers boxing him in, he drove to his attorney’s office for an hour and a half in the afternoon.
When he came out of his attorney’s office, he strode straight up to one of the surveillance vehicles and requested the surveillant to contact the agent who had tried to interview him the day before and ask him to come to Howard’s home today between 5:00 and 5:30. Then he turned around, walked back to his car, and with his entourage boxing him in, drove straight home. Soon after he arrived there, the FBI called him and told him that the interview would have to take place at Room 327 of the Hilton, same as yesterday. Howard agreed, and drove to the hotel for another interview.
He entered the interview room and from the beginning presented a reasonable, cooperative demeanor and explained that his attorney in Albuquerque felt out of his depth in this matter, and he was in the process of getting another attorney who would better be able to guide him. He gave the agents the name of the attorney in Albuquerque and assured them he would e meeting with him at the attorney’s first convenience. One of the agents told Howard that the Albuquerque attorney should call the FBI and discuss “the type of polygraph test which might be given, including the nature of questions.” Howard appeared receptive. He called his Santa Fe attorney, then called the office of the Albuquerque attorney in the presence of the agents. When all of this was finished, he explained that he would be traveling to Austin on Sunday, September 22, and would return on Monday, September 23. He said that on Tuesday , September 24, would be prepared to meet with the FBI. Lost in this discussion, apparently, was any mention of the existing deadline of September 21, which Howard had agreed to the previous day, for his decision regarding the polygraph.130
Word was dutifully sent back to FBI Headquarters that Howard appeared to be coming around and was getting ready to talk.
* * * * *
Meanwhile as the news of Howard’s change in attitude was being communicated to FBI Headquarters in Washington, a separate team of FBI agents were knocking on the door of the condominium on Padre Island near Corpus Christi where Howard Bosch lived. Bosch had been under FBI observation for weeks and now that the decision had been made to interview Howard – the FBI presumed he would alert Bosch, and so the decision had been made to interview him as well.
Bosch looked startled, but agreed readily enough to the interview. Accompanied by the FBI agents, he went to a nearby hotel where Room 800 had been prepared for the interview.
Early in this first interview, Bosch acknowledged having heard numerous statements from Howard about contacting Soviet intelligence – but he claimed that he never took it seriously, and that it had seemed to him that Howard was just “joking to relieve his depression.” He noted that the apparent admissions “were usually made in a joking manner either during or after he had been drinking and that he had no actual knowledge of contact with any Soviet officials.” Then, having established that all of Howard’s admissions had been made in this manner, and thus didn’t seem particularly credible – he went on to tell the FBI of the meeting in New Orleans and other meetings with Howard, and detailed other statements by Howard, all made in the same drunken, quasi-joking manner, including asking Bosch to look after Mary and young Lee if he ever defected, and also stating that before being fired he had removed documents from CIA and “buried them” for possible later use with the Soviets.
By the conclusion of the interview, the FBI had key “admissions” that came close to being sufficient for an arrest warrant to be issued – but fell short because of Bosch’s insistence that the admissions by Howard had not been serious or credible.
But was Bosch telling the truth?
The reports on both interviews – Howard and Bosch – landed with a thump at FBI Headquarters. The name of the game was to get enough evidence for an arrest warrant to be issued. Howard clearly wasn’t going to supply such information, at least not willingly. Bosch, on the other hand, might. The truth was, Bosch had already provided information sufficient for an arrest warrant except for his repeated insistence that the statements by Howard had all been delivered in a drunken, possibly joking context. Under repeated questioning Bosch had held firm, insisting it to be so.
On the evening of September 20, Howard placed a phone call in which he commented that he intended to take an FBI polygraph the next day. This was reported to Albuquerque and from there, to FBI Headquarters. It was seen as further evidence that Howard was coming around.
A decision was made:
After consultation with FBI HQ and DOJ, based on Howard’s anticipated cooperation, [redacted] directs that surveillance revert back to discreet surveillance to avoid antagonizing Howard.
The FBI had taken Howard’s bait.
He would later confirm that by the time he left his attorney’s office and approached a surveillant to ask for a meeting, he had already decided to escape and had formulated a plan to do it. For that plan to work, it was essential that the FBI desist from the bumper-lock surveillance.
Everything he did from that point on had been designed to achieve just that.
* * * * *
One of the techniques that Platt and his team had taught Howard when training him for Moscow was called “JIB”, for Jack-in-the-Box. It called for the use of a dummy to replace an officer who escaped surveillance by jumping from a slowly moving vehicle in a surveillance blind spot. On Saturday morning, September 21, Howard fabricated a crude but effective JIB dummy. He used a sawed-off broomstick with a coat hanger for the shoulders, his wife’s Styrofoam wig holder for a head, and one of his leftover disguise wigs from IO training. He dressed the body in a beige Calvin Klein jacket, and topped off the ensemble with a orange and white baseball hat with the word “Navajo” on it. Once it was complete, he wrapped it in a raincoat and took it to the garage, where he put it in the floor well on the passenger side of the couple’s red Oldsmobile. He also disconnected the brake lights, so that they would not flash when they slowed for the bailout.
The plan was to accomplish the escape that evening, and all day Howard spent his final hours with Mary and baby Lee.
At 3 PM, FBI Special Agent Joseph Connor* began an 18 hour shift as the sole “technical surveillance monitor” at “Bell Tower” – the construction van with CCTV coverage of the Howard residence. He had not previously worked at Bell Tower but in early September he had been involved in a discreet surveillance of Howard and at that time had been briefed about Howard’s intelligence training, and in particular his counter-surveillance training by CIA.
Since it was his first stint at Bell Tower, he was given a 45 minute briefing by the previous tech monitor on how to operate the technical equipment which included CCTV of the Howard residence, an encrypted radio for communication with the surveillance team, and a telephone for communication with supervisors in Albuquerque. The telephone tap of the Howard phone was also monitored from Bell Tower, and Connor was checked out on this equipment as well.
Connor was then told that Howard had been interviewed the previous day and was balking at the FBI proposal that he take a polygraph. Also, although he wasn’t specifically briefed on Howard’s plans for the evening, while he was being briefed, the agent briefing him had several radio contacts with the surveillance team members making sure they were aware of what was known about Howard’s dinner plans – i.e. that a babysitter was expected, and Howard and his wife were expected to leave shortly thereafter.
Connor had radio contact with the surveillance team that totaled seven individuals. Although he had contact with them, he would later claim that he did not know where they were stationed and assumed they had a view of the Howard residence. Thus, he would claim, he did not understand that he had the sole “eye” on the residence.
Meanwhile, the reality was that the surveillants attempting “discreet” coverage could not be positioned with an “eye” on the residence because to do so would make them instantly obvious. Verano Loop consisted of square, flat-roofed homes on one-acre scrub desert lots set a hundred feet or more off the main road. This meant that there were zero vehicles parked on the street, and thus no place near the residence for surveillance to wait. This was true of Verano Loop and Avenue Del Monte Alto, the main road where the Howards would eventually emerge. So not only did they not have a view of the residence – they didn’t have a view of the entrances and exits and were thus wholly dependent on notification from Connor.
The elements for disaster were set.
At 3:30 Connor was left alone at Bell Tower.
With an eye on the CCTV monitor, he settled in to wait.
Sometime after 5 PM Connor monitored several phone calls by the babysitter emanating from the Howard residence. He logged these without notifying the surveillants that the babysitter was now obviously at the Howard residence. He then monitored an incoming phone call from Mary Howard, telling the babysitter that she and Howard were at Alfonso’s, a well-known Santa Fe restaurant. He notified no one of this call.
After that, he saw nothing.
Further complicating matters, the CCTV monitor was acting up and the images – which were being relayed via microwave from the camera to Bell Tower -- were fuzzy, with low resolution and poor contrast.
Connor did not report this to anyone.
Sometime after 5:30PM, he overheard radio chatter from the surveillance team indicating that a unit was being dispatched to do a drive-by of the Howard residence. This was repeated several times.
At around 6:00 PM Connor received a radio message from the surveillance units asking if he could see Howard’s car. He replied that he could see the jeep but not the Oldsmobile, which was normally parked inside the garage and not visible on the monitor. At 7PM he heard radio traffic indicating that one surveillance unit was being dispatched to conduct a drive-by of the house, and other units were being dispatched to look for the Howards in various parts of Santa Fe.
At 7:01 PM Connor saw the babysitter leave and a few minutes later he monitored a call in which Howard’s voice was heard leaving a message with his psychiatrist requesting a meeting the following week. He immediately informed the surveillance units, and they returned to the area of Howard’s residence since it was apparent that the Howards had returned.136
* * * * * * *
For Ed and Mary Howard, Saturday, September 21, 1985, was both a wrenching emotional crisis, and an operational challenge which mimicked the challenges they had trained for in Moscow. In fact, the operational task was precisely the same one they had trained for before going to Moscow, and that was to spring Ed from surveillance without alerting them that he had disappeared.
But the task involved more than the physical disappearance. It required maintaining an appearance of calm while carrying out various interactions that supported the narrative on display to the FBI.
Early in the day, Howard and Mary, accompanied by baby Lee, drove from Verano Loop to Howard’s office. After twenty minutes at the office, they drove back home. Surveillance noted nothing unusual.
At 4 PM, Gina Jackson, Lee’s babysitter, arrived at the Howard’s residence. In later interviews Jackson would say that Mary Howard seemed distracted and was not as friendly as usual. As soon as Gina arrived, Mary led the babysitter and baby Lee directly out onto the patio in back. Mary did not provide the sitter a phone number as she usually did, but did provide the name of Alfonso’s Restaurant in Santa Fe where said she and Ed would be having dinner.
At 4:30 PM, the Howards left.
For Mary and Ed, the departure went smoothly. There was no immediate sign of surveillance, but that was not unexpected. At some point along the twenty-five minute drive to the restaurant surveillance would show itself. It always had before.
Then the unexpected happened. There was no surveillance.
To Howard, this was both baffling and alarming. The thing about surveillance, he knew, was that as long as you know where they are, you can manipulate them. But if you don’t know where they are, you can’t.
Howard would later write that the absence of surveillance bothered him not only because he didn’t know where they were at the moment -- but also because his plan relied heavily on “selling” surveillance on the idea that he had gone out Saturday night with Mary, then returned home and was firmly “tucked in” by surveillance for the weekend so that, knowing for sure they were at home, they would not come “snooping around” on Sunday trying to confirm he was there.
At Alfonso’s, thinking surveillance might have missed him, Howard asked Mary to call home and check on Lee, and in the process to be sure and mention the name of the restaurant and its phone number. He knew the home phone was tapped, and if surveillance had somehow missed their exit, this would provide the means for surveillance to reacquire them.
At around 6:30 PM the Howards got up and prepared to leave the restaurant. Howard made sure to be seen departing wearing an orange and white baseball cap that matched the one that the JIB dummy would be wearing.
Working as a team, as they had in the SE Internal Operations Course, Ed and Mary Howard left the restaurant without betraying any unusual emotion, in spite of the enormity of the moment for both of them. Mary drove, with Ed in the passenger seat – part of a pre-established pattern reflecting Mary’s alcohol-free “designated driver” status.
Mary drove the speed limit and, after a brief detour on side streets “in an effort to clean themselves” soon they neared the junction of Canyon Road and Old Pecos Trail. This was where Howard had previously identified a JIB escape site, where the road dipped, turned to the right, and had hedges on the right side that would provide cover.
At the site, Mary slowed to five miles an hour and, after moving the JIB dummy to the passenger seat and strapping it in, Howard bailed out, landing hard on his right arm and rolling into the bushes.
A few minutes later Mary and the JIB dummy arrived home, driving into the garage at approximately 7:00 PM. The garage door closed behind her, and the JIB scenario was complete.
After arriving home, Mary dialed Ed’s psychiatrist, was routed to voice mail, and played a recorded message in Ed’s voice that he had recorded previously, further cementing the fiction that Howard was at home with her.
Meanwhile, Howard had made his way on foot to his office, where he left a resignation letter for his boss, and a goodbye letter for Mary that was written in such a way as to make it appear that she had no knowledge of his plan. He hoped that Mary would be able to simply tell the FBI that he left the house sometime early Sunday morning and went for a walk into the mountains, never coming back. It was a long shot -- but he would give it a try.
From there Howard walked three blocks to the Loretto Hotel, using the alias “Preston”, caught the Shuttlejack airport limousine from there. By 9 PM, Howard was at the Albuquerque airport.
From Albuquerque he flew to Tucson, bought a ticket in true name using his TWA Credit card, overnighted in the airport, then left at 7:50 AM on board TWA flight 388 to New York, and from there, he was on board TWA Flight 730 for Copenhagen at 6:15 PM on September 22, 1985, arriving in Copenhagen at 9:30M on September 23 after an intermediate stop in London.
* * * * *
Throughout the afternoon and early evening of September 21, as the Howards were preparing and executing the escape plan, the FBI was conducting a second interview of Howard Bosch on Padre Island in Texas. During the eight hour interview, the special agents conducting the interview turned up the heat and by the time they were finished, Bosch had admitted that yes, Howard had definitely been in actual operational contact with the Soviets; yes, he had provided them secrets; and yes, had had done so with intent to harm America. The three prongs necessary for an arrest for espionage were met.
Now, at last, the FBI had what it needed to get an arrest warrant for Howard.
* * * * *
On September 22, 1985, all was quiet at the Howard residence.
At 3:05PM agents rang the doorbell looking for Howard and intending to confront him with information obtained from Bosch the previous day. Mary Howard answered the door and told them Ed was out jogging.
At 3:30 PM they returned, and this time Mary told them Ed was still not home. The agents then told Mary Howard about the interview the previous day with Howard Bosch, stating that Bosch had provided information which “further corroborated our initial information that Edward Howard had compromised sensitive CIA information to the Soviets. She was then told the Bosch had been administered a polygraph test; and finally she was shown an article that had appeared the day before in the Albuquerque newspaper about the arrest of Soviet scientist Adolf Tolkachev – and that Howard was knowledgeable of that operation and had disclosed details of it to the Soviets. The agents told Mary to “relay the information to Ed Howard and to tell him that his pact with the FBI had been broken.”
The FBI received a call on Sunday afternoon from Phil Baca, Howard’s boss, who had come into the office unexpectedly on Sunday and found Howard’s resignation.
At that point, Ed Howard was in the TWA departure lounge at JFK airport in New York, waiting to board a flight to Copenhagen. He was traveling in true name on his diplomatic passport, which had been mailed to his parents’ address in Dallas and had never been canceled.
But as with everything else about the end game of operation Trumphet, the FBI was a step behind Howard, and by the time the information from Baca had been processed and the FBI was fully aware that Howard had escaped, it was too late. He was airborne over the Atlantic in route to Copenhagen, Finland, and finally, Moscow.
Ed Howard had escaped.
A fantastic thriller. I enjoyed reading!
The capital of Denmark is Copenhagen, not Finland as stated.
Otherwise, it's a wonderful story.