Deeper Look: A Second KGB Officer Has Alleged Trump Was Recruited by KGB

Yury Shvets, a KGB Major in the 1980s, has made claims consisent with those by Alnur Musayef of the Kazakh KGB

Note: This is part of “The Krasnov File”, an ongoing project to analyze the 40 plus years of history between Donald Trump and Russia, and in particular to evaluate allegations of Trump being an “asset” of the KGB.

Recently former KGB officer Alnur Mussayev alleged that Donald Trump was recruited by the KGB in the 1980s under the codename "Krasnov." (See my post on this here.). Musayev is not the first KGB officer to make such claims. Yury Shvets, a former KGB major, has asserted that Russian intelligence has been cultivating Trump as an asset for over four decades. Shvets, who served in the KGB's First Chief Directorate during the 1980s, provided allegations that generally track with Musayev’s claims.

Shvets' Allegations Generally Track With Musayef’s

According to Shvets, Trump's initial contact with Soviet intelligence dates back to 1980, when he was identified as a potential asset. Shvets claims that during Trump's 1987 visit to Moscow, the KGB was heavily involved in stage managing the visit, orchestrating meetings designed to flatter and influence him, planting seeds of encouragement of Trump’s then nascent political ambition — and setting up those ambitions in a way that aligned with Soviet interests. Notably, upon returning to the United States, Trump took out full-page newspaper ads criticizing U.S. foreign policy and defense spending, actions that Shvets suggests were influenced by his interactions in Moscow. (MS Comment; Shvets’s depiction of the KGB stage-managing Trump’s 1987 trip to Russia is fully consistent with what would be expected of the KGB in that era and in that situation. Specifically, we know that the KGB had been tasked to recruit Western businessmen, and we also know that playing a ‘long game’ with potential political leaders was always a key part of the KGb playook. So these allegations by Shvets are not revelatory - but rather they reinforce what was known of KGB practices at the time.)

Shvets provided a series of interview to Craig Unger, which Unger summarized in his book American Kompromat. Shvets elaborates on the KGB's tactics, stating that they "played the game as if they were immensely impressed by his personality." This approach, Shvets suggests, was tailored to appeal to Trump's vanity and ego, making him more susceptible to influence. Shvets further asserts that the KGB circulated an internal cable in 1987, celebrating the successful execution of an active measure by a newly cultivated American asset—referring to Trump's newspaper ads promoting policies favorable to the Soviet Union.

(MS Comment: In my work in intelligence, the core concept around recruitment was to understand what was lacking or needed in the life of the target, and find a way to supply it. Trump’s extreme ego/vanity issues would clearly have been something to be focused on in any intelligence operation targeted against him. These would have made him easy to manipulate — but also they would create “control issues” — i.e. it might be easy to manipulate him, but his volatility, feelings of grandiosity, etc, would make it difficult to achieve a fully controlled agent relationship. So while there are many who tend to say Trump was “perfect agent material’ — I think it’s more complicated than that. We will be addressing this in more detail as we pursue this further.)

Background on Yury Shvets

Yury Shvets began his career in Soviet intelligence after graduating from the Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University with a degree in international law. He underwent further training at the Academy of Foreign Intelligence, where he claims he studied alongside Vladimir Putin and got to know the future leader. From 1985 to 1987, Shvets was stationed in Washington, D.C., operating under the cover of a correspondent for TASS, the Soviet state-owned news agency. (MS Comment: This places him in Washington during he infamous “Year of the Spy” — 1985. See my post about Valery Martynov, another KGB officer in Washington at the time, and Vitaly Yurchenko. This is when I was serving in Moscow for CIA — see “Year of the Spy Book Trailer.)

In 1990, Shvets resigned from the KGB on political grounds as the Soviet Union was disintegrating. Facing suspicion from his superiors, he left Russia in 1993 by obtaining a forged passport and bribing a border guard, eventually relocating permanently to the United States, where he later obtained citizenship.

During his tenure in the KGB, Shvets was involved in cultivating and recruiting American assets. He claims to have recruited two key sources of political intelligence: "Socrates," a former aide to President Jimmy Carter with strong ties to Greece, and "Sputnitsa," a journalist working in Washington. These assertions, detailed in his book "Washington Station: My Life as a KGB Spy in America," have been subjects of scrutiny and debate. (MS Comment: There was serious effort put forward to confirm the identity of Socrates, ut those efforts never resulted in anything definitive.)

Regarding his knowledge of Trump's alleged cultivation, Shvets' insights are based on his experience within the KGB's First Chief Directorate, which was responsible for foreign intelligence operations. He was in Washington from 1985-87 and thus had a window into operations against Americans. There is no indication that he was directly involved in the Trump operation, however. Still, his position would have granted him access to internal communications and reports detailing such activities. (MS Comment: Shvets’ claims are ultimately interesting and a valid piece of the puzzle, but I have not yet been able to find any indication that he had direct involvement and while his claims are interesting and plausible, I do not see a basis to consider them to be definitive.)

Understanding "Asset" and "Recruitment"

The term “recruited” or “recruited asset” has been used many times to try and describe Trump’s relationship with Russian intelligence. It is important to have a reasonably nuanced understanding of all the things “recruitment” an mean — particularly as it would be used and understood by former KGB operatives. John Sipher, a former CIA Senior Intellience Service officer (and a welcome reader/commenter here at Deeper Look) provides clarity on this topic, writing in Just Security.

The Russians have a much more expansive and nuanced view of who is an agent working on behalf of their system. Whereas the U.S. mainly relies on a relatively small cadre of fully-controlled and tested secret sources, Russia sees their foreign intelligence role in a much broader way. They too seek fully vetted and controlled sources with access to unique reporting, but they are also more comfortable with sources who can help them in some manner or other even if they are not fully recruited spies. Throughout the Cold War the Kremlin relied on a wide variety of sources, some witting and some not – from fully recruited spies to semi-witting people willing to spout their nonsense. The Russian services would be comfortable building a relationship with a journalist who accepts background material but does not take specific direction, while the CIA would most likely have no interest in that sort of connection.

The Russians – like the Soviets before them – generally have a much larger stable of assets. They utilize fellow travelers, terrorists, and members of fringe groups as well as maintaining friendships with people who either knowingly or unknowingly accept their propaganda. They call these people “useful idiots.” We have accordingly seen that the Russians use all sorts of people for their benefit – propagandists, useful idiots, witting collaborators, sympathizers, hackers, students, recruited spies, and oligarchs who do the bidding of the Kremlin. A good example of the latter is Yevgeny Prigozhin, a billionaire restauranteur close to Putin. Although he has no formal role or experience in intelligence, diplomacy or military affairs, the Kremlin uses him when it is in Moscow’s interest. He is the owner of the now-famous St. Petersburg troll factory, and he also runs paramilitary units in Syria and Ukraine. To maintain your wealth and social status in Russia, it makes sense to say yes when the Kremlin comes calling.

Sipher emphasizes that while it's plausible Trump may be compromised due to personal and financial dealings with Russia, this doesn't necessarily mean he is an "agent" in the traditional intelligence sense. The nature of such relationships can vary, ranging from unwitting associations to more deliberate collaborations. (MS Comment: I agree that in order to understand Trump’s relationship with Russia, Putin, and Russian Intelligence it’s necessary to have an awarenessof the nuances that Sipher identifies. I recommend reading his entire article in Just Security.)

A Measured Perspective

In summary, the allegations presented by both Musayev and Shvets suggest a concerted effort by Soviet, and later Russian, intelligence to develop a relationship with Trump over several decades. Trump’s own actions clearly suggest that such a relationshp exists on some level. He displays a clear affinity for Putin, Russia, and the Russian position on many issues that in the past have been treated as adversarial to American interests. But the true nature and depth of Trump’s relationship to Russia, Putin, and Russian intelligence remains elusive. The work documenting and analyzing it continues.