A Deeper Look at Claims by KGB Officer that Trump was Recruited by Soviet Intelligence in the 1980s

I'm a Former CIA Russia Specialist -- Here's My Take

The anti-Trump internet has been ablaze for a couple of days about claims by a former KGB officer that Donald Trump was recruited by the KGB in the 1980s and given the code name "Krasnov." Curiously, sites like Yahoo and The Daily Beast ran the story, then took it down. Others have left it up. I've gone back to the original source—a Russian-language Facebook post—and have taken a hard look at the whole thing. As many of you know, I'm a former CIA Russia specialist who served in Moscow right about the time Trump first visited. Here's what I make of this.

The Allegations

The recent claims originate from Alnur Mussayev, a former high-ranking Soviet and Kazakh intelligence official. In a Facebook post dated February 20, 2025, Mussayev alleged that during his tenure in the 6th Directorate of the USSR's KGB in 1987, Donald Trump, then a 40-year-old American businessman, was recruited under the codename "Krasnov." This directorate specialized in recruiting businessmen from capitalist countries. Mussayev further claimed that Trump's personal file is currently managed by a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Assessing the Credibility of the Claims

Alnur Mussayev is a credible individual. His career biography and everything available about him suggest that his claims should not be dismissed outright. Mussayev served in high-level intelligence roles in both the Soviet KGB and later in Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee (KNB). While his career trajectory has had political complications, there is no indication that he has a history of fabricating intelligence claims. His allegations about Trump, therefore, deserve cautious, open-minded consideration.

A key question is — do the claims track with other information that is known already? It is well-documented that Donald Trump visited Moscow in 1987 at the invitation of the Soviet government. It is equally well-documented that the KGB at that time had a mandate to identify, assess, and potentially recruit prominent Western businessmen who visited the Soviet Union. Trump, given his status as an ambitious, media-savvy real estate mogul with international interests, would certainly have been considered a valid target. It is almost inconceivable that Trump could have made a trip of that nature without coming into direct or indirect contact with KGB personnel. Even if he was unaware of it, his Soviet hosts would have included intelligence officers, his Intourist guides would have been KGB-connected, and his interactions would have been observed and analyzed.

Additionally, Trump’s marriage to a Czech model, Ivana Trump (née Zelníčková), in 1977, would almost certainly have put him on the radar of the Czech intelligence service (StB), which worked closely with the KGB. Previous reporting has confirmed that the StB maintained a file on Trump, with records indicating they monitored him through his wife’s connections. This further supports the notion that he would have been a known entity to Eastern Bloc intelligence services by the time of his Moscow visit.

Taken in aggregate, these factors lead to the conclusion that Mussayev’s claims are at least plausible. His credibility, the KGB’s known interest in recruiting Western businessmen, Trump’s exposure to Soviet intelligence, and his preexisting ties to the Eastern Bloc all suggest that a recruitment attempt could have taken place. Whether it was successful remains an open question.

What Does 'Recruitment' Mean?

It is important to clarify what ‘recruitment’ would have meant in this context. The KGB’s goal was to cultivate Western influencers, including politicians, businessmen, and journalists, not necessarily as paid, controlled agents but as willing or semi-witting collaborators. Trump, if recruited, would not necessarily have been a formal asset engaged in espionage. More likely, the KGB would have sought to develop a relationship in which he saw personal or financial advantages in cooperating with Soviet interests.

Many Western businessmen who traveled to the USSR were approached by the KGB. Some were simply asked for benign cooperation—such as providing assessments of business climates, sharing industry gossip, or introducing useful contacts. Others were encouraged to maintain long-term relationships that could evolve over time. On the U.S. side, the CIA regularly debriefed businessmen who traveled to the Soviet Union, and many reported overtures from Soviet intelligence.

One piece of collateral evidence often cited in this discussion is that shortly after Trump’s return from the USSR, he took out full-page ads in major U.S. newspapers criticizing American foreign policy. While the claim that these were ‘anti-NATO’ ads is an oversimplification, they did represent a striking shift in his rhetoric. Trump spent nearly $100,000 on these ads, which argued that the U.S. was being exploited by its allies and should stop defending wealthy countries that were not paying their fair share. This was not an outright attack on NATO, but it echoed longstanding Soviet narratives aimed at weakening Western alliances. The timing raises questions about whether his Moscow trip played a role in his sudden engagement with global politics. However, this remains speculative.

Conclusion: A “Possibility Not to Be Excluded”

Intelligence analysis is not the same as law enforcement. It is not about proving a case beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather about assembling pieces of incomplete information and assessing the most likely explanations based on deep knowledge of the subject matter and key players. A favorite expression among analysts is ‘a possibility not to be excluded,’ and that is where I land on this matter.

Mussayev’s claims are compelling, consistent with other collateral reporting, and fit within a broader pattern of known Soviet intelligence activities. However, they are not conclusive. Even if Trump was ‘recruited’ in 1987, that does not necessarily mean he has remained a recruited asset for the past 40 years. Yet, it does raise the possibility that his relationships with Russian intelligence figures have left him vulnerable to manipulation, even decades later.

One key misconception about espionage is the idea that ‘kompromat’ is the primary tool of recruitment. While kompromat can play a role, coerced agents are often unreliable and difficult to control. A much more effective intelligence relationship is one in which the collaborator sees mutual benefit. Trump’s rhetoric and actions in recent years—his reluctance to criticize Putin, his efforts to weaken NATO, and his alignment with Russian disinformation campaigns—do not suggest someone acting under duress. Instead, they suggest someone who, for his own reasons, has fully embraced the Russian position.

Whether or not Trump was recruited in 1987 may ultimately be less important than the fact that today, he is aligned with Putin’s interests. Whatever the origins of that alignment, its current reality is undeniable.